MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
RUDOLF EUCKEN
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MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
BY THE SAME AUTHOR
THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN LIFE
As Viewed by the Great Thinkers, from Plato lo the Present Time.
Translated by W. S. Hough and W. R. Boyce-Gibson. Second English Edition. Demy 8vo, cloth, 10/6 net.
A presentation of the various philosophies of life as they have taken shape in the minds of the Great Thinkers. The book is in three parts : Hellenism, Christianity, and the Modern World, and concludes with a suggestive chapter on the " Present Situation."
LONDON: T. FISHER UNWIN.
p
MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
A STUDY OF THE SPIRITUAL AND INTELLECTUAL MOVE- MENTS OF THE PRESENT DAY
RUDOLF EUCKEN
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF JENA ; AWARDED THE NOBEL PRIZE FOR LITERATURE, I 908
TRANSLATED BY
MEYRICK BOOTH, B.Sc, Ph.D. (Jena)
T. FISHER UNWIN
LONDON: ADELPHI TERRACE
LEIPSIC: INSELSTRASSE 2Q
1912
{All rights reserved.)
CONTENTS
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION . PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION
PAGE
. 9
. 15
. 17
. 21
INTRODUCTION :
The Present State op Appaibs and the Task with which it PRESENTS Us ...... .
23
A. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OP SPIRITUAL LIFE
1. SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE.
(a) Historical ......
(b) The Nineteenth Century
(c) The Positive Position ....
1. Introduction .....
2. The Fundamental Concept of the Spiritual Life
3. The Relationship between Man and the Spiritual Life
4. The Results as they affect the Concept of Truth
35 44 53 53 57 60 62
2. THEORETICAL — PRACTICAL (INTELLECTUALISM — VOLUNTARISM).
(ft) HiSTORICAE, . . . . . . . .64
(b) Voluntarism . . . . . . .70
(c) Pragmatism . . . . . . . .75
(d) OuB OWN Position : Activism . . . . .79
(e) Intellect and Intellectualism . . . . .81
1. The Invasion of Modern Life by Intellectualism . . 82
2. The Life-Process as the Foundation of Knowledge . . 85
3. The Quest for Truth and its Motive Power . . .89
4. Consequences in the Sphere of Knowledge . . .93
5. Consequences with regard to the History of Philosophy . 96
3. IDEALISM— REALISM.
(a) The Terms ....
(b) The Conflict op Practical Ideals
1. Nineteenth-century Realism
2. The Limitations of the New Realism
5
99 101 103 105
CONTENTS
PAGE
3. Criticism of the Traditional Forms of Idealism . . 107
4. The Problem of Reality . . . . . .110
5. The Necessity for a New Idealism .... 113
B. THE PEOBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
. THOUGHT AND EXPERIENCE (METAPHYSICS).
(a) Historical ........ 119
(b) The Right of an Independent Philosophy . . . 129
(c) The Tendency towards Metaphysics .... 141
(d) The Pursuit after Knowledge : a General Survey . 149
(e) Estimation op Rationalism and Empiricism . . . 155
2. MECHANICAL— ORGANIC (TELEOLOGY).
(a) On the History of the Terms and Concepts
(b) On the History op the Problem
(c) The Present-day Conflict
1. The Philosophical Aspect of the Problem
2. The Scientific Aspect of the Problem .
3. The Problem in the Social Sphere
165 169
182 182 185 189
3. LAW.
(a) Historical ........ 195
(b) The Problem op Law in the Modern World . . 201
C. THE WOELD-PROBLEM.
1. MONISM AND DUALISM.
(a) The Concepts : Historical and Critical Remarks . . 215
(b) The Monism of To-day ...... 230
2. EVOLUTION.
(a) On the History op the Term ..... 240 (fe) On the History op the Concept and Problem op Evolution 242
(c) The Complications and Limitations op the merely Evolu-
tionary Doctrine ...... 255
(d) The Requirements op a New Type op Life . . . 272
D. THE PROBLEMS OF HUMAN LIFE.
CIVILISATION (OR HUMAN CULTURE).
(a) On the History op the Term and Concept . . . 281
(b) Critical . . . . . . . .288
1. The Nature and Value of Civilisation .... 288
2. The Problem of the Content of Civilisation . . .291
3. The Uncertainty in the Relationship of Man to Civilisation . 294
CONTENTS
(c) The Requirements op a True Civilisation
1. The Necessity of a Deeper Foundation
2. The Necessity of an Inner Development of Civilisation
PAGE
. 298 . 298 . 302
2. HISTORY.
(a) Towards the Development op the Problem
(b) Demands and Prospects .
Appendix: The Concept "Modern" .
308 318 330
3. SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL (SOCIALISM).
(a) The Relationship between Society and the Individual
1. Historical ......
2. The Problems of To-Day :
a. The Inadequacy of a merely Social Civilisation
/3. The Inadequacy of a merely Individual Civilisation
y. The Necessity for an Inner Overcoming of the Antithesis 373
(b) The Social-Democratic Movement .... 374
341 341
351 363
4. THE PROBLEMS OP MORALITY.
(a) The Present Insecure Position of Morality
(b) Morality and Metaphysics
(c) Morality and Art . . . . .
1. On the History of the Problem .
2. The Problems of the Present Day :
a. Modern /Estheticism
/3. The Position of Art in Modern Life
385 388 393 393
400 404
5. PERSONALITY AND CHARACTER. (a) Personality
1. On the History of the Term
2. On the History of the Concept
3. Investigation of the Problem (6) Character .
1. On the History of the Term and Concept
2. The Present Position
409 409 412 414 422 422 425
6. THE FREEDOM OP THE WILL.
(a) Introduction . . . .
(b) Remarks on the Determinist Position
431 434
CONTENTS E. ULTIMATE PEOBLEMS.
FAQE
1. THE VALUE OP LIFE, (a) Introduction : On the History op the Terms , . 447
(6) The Perplexities op the Present Situation . . . 449
THE RELIGIOUS PROBLEM (IMMANENCE — TRAN- SCENDENCE), (a) On the History op the Terms ..... 462 (6) The Trend op the Modern World towards Immanence . 464
(c) The Complications in the Concept op Immanence . . 467
(d) The Revival op the Religious Problem . . . 469
(e) The Demands made by the Present Position op Religion . 471
CONCLUSION .479
INDEX 481
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE
The present work is a translation of the 4th edition of the Geistige Stromungen der Gegenwart (Veit & Co., 1909).
I have endeavoured throughout to render the sense of the original in the simplest English I could command, but I have not attempted to secure exact literal accuracy. Considerable care has been taken to bring the terminology as far as possible into line with that employed in the other English translations of Eucken's works.
Eucken's earlier writings were historical, his constructive works being of comparatively recent date. The Main Cur- rents of Modem Thought forms a link between the two periods ; it starts from a broad historical basis and presses forward to positive construction. Here we may follow the growth of Eucken's philosophy, from its roots, lying far back in the historical work, to its full flower, as seen in the positive philosophy itself While the Jena professor's other recent works concern themselves in the main with the general exposition of his convictions, the present study reveals in detail the extensive groundwork upon which these convictions have been built up, and in particular it illustrates the various steps by which the author has been led to adopt the concept of the spiritual lije as the basis of his whole philosophy.
Eucken's method is one of elimination. One by one he examines the various attempts at a synthesis of life with which the thought of the day provides us. One by one they are found to be incomplete or to be involved in inner contradictions, while in each case it is seen that a recognition of an independent spiritual life would remedy the incompleteness or remove the contradiction. Far from being a mere assumption (as will
10 TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE
certainly be supposed by those who are suspicious of the term "spiritual"), the spiritual life is thus seen to be nothing less than a necessity. Through its recognition alone can we explain the known content of the universe.
For those who are commencing a study of Eucken's thought a few words with regard to the exact meaning of the concept " spiritual life " may not be out of place. As this concept is the key to Eucken's whole philosophy, it is of the utmost importance that it should be clearly understood. The matter is perhaps best approached through a consideration of the most popular philosophy of the present day, namely, that general view of life which (whether it be called agnosticism, positivism, empiricism, materialism, or naturalism) declares that we know only that which is revealed to us through the senses, that man is not essentially anything more than a higher animal, and that there is no spirit (man's entire psychic life being regarded as no more than a mere product of natural forces) ; the higher is thus made entirely dependent upon the lower. Far different is the aspect of aff'airs when looked at from Eucken's point of view: the living spirit (or the spiritual life) now stands at the very centre of the universe, and is itself the most central and positive reality of which humanity can have any knowledge : " a spiritual life transcending all human life forms the ultimate basis of reality." This life is more primary than matter itself (the con- cept of matter being, in reality, one of the vaguest and most uncertain in the whole realm of thought). The recognition of an independent spiritual life is the first step towards all further knowledge and the first necessity of any adequate view of life as a whole. The spiritual life is not derived from any natural basis. It is not a product of evolution. It is superior to all time and to all change : " change (and with it evolution) is absolutely out of the question as far as the substance of spiritual life is concerned." It is entirely distinct from the whole realm of natural phenomena, and, as Eucken himself says, in spiritual life we have to do " with something essentially different from any process following natural laws." The spiritual life works within the natural sphere, but it works as an independent reality ; it is itself superior to the whole mechanism of nature.
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE 11
This life must be conceived of as something quite distinct from the human intellect and from every kind of merely human psychic life. The spiritual life is itself the foundation of truth and knowledge. It is cosmic, absolute and eternal.
It will at once be asked, If the spiritual life be thus indepen- dent and absolute, how can man have any part in it, how can it affect him? Why, in short, should we bother about it at all? In reply to this Eucken would maintain that man's relationship to the spiritual life is the most immediate and vital of all human interests, for this life is itself the very centre of rami s oivn being. The spiritual life does not depend upon man, but man depends upon the spiritual life. In an external sense man may be natural, but in an internal sense he is spiritual, he belongs to the spiritual reality which is behind the whole universe. It is the spiritual life within him which distinguishes man from the animals and forms the root of his unique unifying capacity, as well as of his ethical and religious nature. Spiritual reality thus works within man, but it is not of man. Man attains to his spiritual self by rising above his human self; and only by thus rising does he become independent, for the merely human self is involved in a network of natural processes from which the spiritual life alone is free. The spiritual life is " a cosmic force operative in man " ; here man finds a strength greater than his own. The ethical value of Eucken's philosophy lies in its recognition of a spiritual world of cosmic power and ab- solute and eternal values, a world set above the relativity of human affairs and yet present to man as an ethical imperative. Nor is the ethical point of view lightly to be ignored. A satisfactory philosophy of life must make room for man's ethical nature ; as Balfour says {The Foundations of Belief, p. 356) : '' No uni- fication of beliefs can be practically adequate which does not include ethical beliefs as well as scientific ones ; nor which refuses to count among ethical beliefs, not merely those which have immediate reference to moral commands, but those also which make possible moral sentiments, ideals, and aspirations, and which satisfy our ethical needs. Any system which, when worked out to its legitimate issues^iailsfb efi'ect this object can afford no permanent habitation for the spirit of man."
12 TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE
There can be no doubt that our inner life demands an authority which shall be objective and absolute (that is, truly authoritative), and at the same time present within man in such a way that its commands are felt to be inwardly compelling and not forced upon man by some external power. I should like to quote an ex- tremely significant passage from Principal P. T. Forsyth's very valuable work Positive Preaching and the Modern Mind (p. 61) ; speaking of what he calls the " inmost authority " he says : "It emerges and wells up under psychological conditions, but it is not a psychological product ... it is not ourselves, it is objec- tive. . . . The thing most immanent in us is a transcendent thing. ..." In order to attain to this inner spiritual world man must fight a battle ; he must overcome the resistance of his non-spiritual nature, which is in perpetual conflict with his spiritual self. The spiritual life is not immanent in man in such a fashion that he can possess it without effort ; it is present *' as a possibility " — it rests with us to lay hold of it. Man cannot participate in the spiritual life without continual and active efibrt ; hence the name — Activism — which Eucken has assigned to his own type of thought. Eucken' s philosophy is therefore marked by a strong dualism. There is a sharp division within man's own nature, a conflict of forces, a struggle for supremacy, a slow and laborious ascent to a world of new and permanent values, to ** a new stage of reality." We read that " man stands at once in time and above time," that he lives " on the boundary of time and eternity, on the horizon where the two run together," and again that " man is the meeting place of different stages of reality, nay, of opposed worlds."
It is not, however, Eucken's intention that reality should finally be looked upon as falling apart into two separate worlds ; on the contrary he regards spiritual life and nature as being, ultimately, stages of a single reality. Man, however, occupies a position at which a transition from the lower to the higher stage has to be effected. He must not therefore allow the distinction between nature and spirit to be obliterated. At the same time Eucken's ultimate goal is a monism — not naturalistic, as it is hardly necessary to point out, but spiritualistic in character.
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTORY NOTE 13
" We have become insecure with regard to all our ideals, nay, with regard to our own being ; we no longer draw upon a common groundwork of convictions, of uniting, directing, elevat- ing forces. In spite of all subjective activity, an inner decline of life is unavoidable if this uncertainty should continue to spread." This brief quotation will suffice to indicate Eucken's attitude towards the life of to-day. He is profoundly convinced that the peoples of to-day, absorbed in the pursuit of material things, intent upon bettering their environment and intoxicated by the surprising triumphs of technical science, have increasingly lost touch with those central spiritual realities without which life can have no meaning or value. In a single phrase, the interests of the modern world are in the main ■peripheral rather than central. Eucken is not only a philosopher ; he is a prophet. His aim is to lead humanity back to central realities, to act as a centripetal force in a world of centrifugal tendencies. He seeks to call attention to the great truth that the whole fabric of human civilisation rests ultimately upon a spiritual basis. It is his belief that the supreme need of the age is a compre- hensive, positive philosophy of life to serve as a rallying point for the scattered and divided forces of humanity. The old syntheses of life, which were satisfactory in their day and genera- tion, are now breaking up and there is need for a new and wider synthesis. Eucken is convinced that only through the recog- nition of an independent spiritual life can the chaos of modern opinions be made to give way to a broad and satisfying philosophy of life.
In conclusion I should like to express my warmest gratitude to Professor Boyce Gibson (now of Melbourne University), the author of Rudolf Eucken's PJdlosophy of Life, who looked through the greater part of the MS., making a large number of invaluable suggestions and clearing up many obscure points. As it is, my task has been a hard one, but without his kind help it would have been much more difficult.
MEYRICK BOOTH. Lbtchwoeth,
June, 1912.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION
The Main Currents of Modern Thought has met with a most friendly reception in Germany and in France, and it would give me very great pleasure should it win friends for itself within the English-speaking world. This work aims in the first place at counteracting the spiritual and intellectual confusion of the present day. I have sought to grasp the specific character of the age through a study of its more central prohlems ; and with the object of liberating these problems from all that is accidental and momentary I have endeavoured to illuminate them from the standpoint of the historical development of humanity. At the same time, this historical treatment shows that spiritual evolution is a matter common to all civilised peoples ; they have all actively participated in this evolution, and all are to-day called to the performance of great common tasks, by which they are raised above and beyond every national and political diff'erence. Nothing is more certain to counteract the lamentable and dangerous hostility of great nations to one another than a better understanding of the complete solidarity of the various nations with regard to those great questions which concern humanity as a whole.
RUDOLF EUCKEN. Jena,
June, 1912,
15
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION
The third edition differs even more from the second than did the second from the first. In the first edition the historical review formed the foundation of the work, while the discussion of the problems themselves was quite a secondary matter ; in the second edition the discussion became far more independent, and in the third it obtained the full primacy. The book is above all an expression of a specific philosophical conviction as a whole, and claims to be considered in this light. This claim has had the effect of essentially altering the mode in which the material had to be presented ; in particular, it demanded a more precise arrangement and division of the subject matter, extending even to the separate sections.
While carrying out these alterations, I believed myself able^at the same time, to retain the fundamental ideas of the earlier editions ; the correlation of historical fact with spiritual reality on the one hand, and treatment under separate headings on the other. Both as a whole and in certain special discussions (which cannot now be anticipated) the book contends that the content of history is more than an object of scholarly research, and that, subject to definite assumptions, it may powerfully contribute to the uplifting of our own work. To start from special problems secures the advantage of tangible points of attack, from which it is possible to progress rapidly to some sort of conclusion. This method is certainly open to an objection ; the general con- viction underlying the whole does not as such receive adequate attention, nor is it set forth in continuous and connected argument. This defect is freely admitted. It is, however, so closely connected with the mode of treatment here adopted that it cannot be remedied. In this respect my earlier books will be found to a certain extent supplementary. The chief lack con-
2 w
18 PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION
sists in the failure to provide an adequate epistemological ground- work, and my next book will be devoted to a thorough discussion of the theory of knowledge.
The different editions are held together, however, even more by a thoroughgoing fundamental conviction than by the method of treatment ; by the conviction, namely, that the ground upon which our whole civilised life and scientific work stands is in- secure ; that this life not only contains an immense variety of individual problems, but that as a whole it needs a drastic revision and a thorough renewal. It is my belief that philosophy must participate in this endeavour ; nay, that philosophy above all is here summoned to energetic co-operation. This has brought me into opposition to the main tendency of contemporary German philosophy, which believes itself able peacefully to continue its scientific work undisturbed by these questions and doubts. We thankfully and gladly recognise the valuable character of this work, more especially in the detailed development of the separate departments of knowledge ; it has accomplished and is accom- plishing much. But at the same time the right and the necessity of the more general problem must be insisted upon with all possible emphasis. In working in this direction we shall not allow ourselves to be in any way affected by the attitude which others may adopt towards this problem ; we shall rely solely upon the inner necessity of the matter.
Recently, however, there have been a multitude of signs bearing witness to the fact that increasingly wide circles are becoming interested in the problems which we have taken up. The inner complications of our civilisation, nay, of our whole spiritual situation, are growing more and more obvious ; we are becoming more and more conscious of serious lapses from truth, of a substitution of phrases for realities and stones for bread. Nothing less than the happiness and meaning of our own existence is at stake. Thus the desire for classification and consolidation makes itself felt with ever-increasing urgency and philosophy is being more and more imperatively called to lend its aid in the solution of these problems of life. New life-move- ments are ascending and men's minds are being swayed by new interests which bid them pursue new aims.
PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION 19
These inner changes have procured for my books an increas- ing number of friends and given me the consciousness of a close spiritual contact with the age, such as I was not previously able to enjoy. It is with peculiar pleasure that I welcome the interest of the young and gi-owing generation, an interest which has grown with unexpected and increasing speed. I hope that this interest may also be extended to this book, and, in particular, I hope that it may assist in a further development of the problems which have here been treated in mere outline, and frequently, there is no doubt, very incompletely. For what we all see more or less clearly before us is ultimately nothing less than the idea of a new man and a new culture. A linking up of forces, an overcoming of all that is merely individual, the inception of a comprehensive movement, can alone enable us to make any progress in dealing with so gigantic a problem.
RUDOLF EUCKEN. Jena,
February, 1904.
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION
The fourth edition has not been so much altered in comparison with the third as was the third in comparison with the second. At the same time some important changes have been made. Several sections have been completely revised and one (that dealing with the Value of Life) has been newly added. All through there has been an ejQFort to make the presentation more easy, the content more complete, the main theses more precise in form, and to grapple more directly with the problems of the age, thus giving the whole a more convincing and forcible form. Far more attention, too, has been given to foreign movements. I hope, therefore, that the new edition as a whole marks a distinct step forward.
RUDOLF EUCKEN. Jena,
End of August, 1908.
31
INTRODUCTION
THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS AND THE TASK WITH WHICH IT PRESENTS US
In examining the life and thought of to-day it is impossible not to be struck in the first place by the extreme confusion which prevails and the accompanying painful insecurity as to the real aim of life. On every side we perceive not only a division of humanity into factions, but often a division within the individual himself. This state of confusion and uncertainty may at first sight appear to be the result of historical traditions working themselves out. We are surrounded to-day by various tenden- cies which have come down to us from the past, and these are not infrequently hostile to one another ; they constitute the heritage and burden that the labour of thousands of years has bequeathed to us. It is the fact of thus being torn by con- tradictions which more than anything else distinguishes modern culture from the simpler conditions of the Ancient World. The Middle Ages handed down a whole philosophy of life containing within itself modes of thought so fundamentally difi'erent as the Grecian and the early Christian, the artistic and the religious, the tendency to embrace life and the tendency to reject it ; these were, however, rather pieced together than harmoniously combined. In opposition to this structural solution the Modern World brought forth a new life energy, the desire for the unhindered expansion of force and for complete dominion over the material world. The detailed development of this, however, led at once to a division within the Modern World itself. On the one hand, there was the soul, with its capacity for thought, demanding to rule the world and human life (intellectualism) ;
23
24 INTRODUCTION
on the other was nature and its mechanism (naturalism). The nineteenth century, being an age of historical knowledge and close speculative reflection, threw such a painfully bright light on all these contradictions that it became impossible to ignore them any longer.
And what a wealth of experience is contained within the nineteenth century itself! Consider the profound changes it passed through, the separate phases of which, in spite of having outwardly dropped into the background, still remain inwardly near to us and incline us in opposite directions : the artistic spiritual culture of the German classical period, a powerful and self-conscious realism and a reaction against this realism in the form of a subjectivism characterised by spiritual self-sufficiency and the development of unchartered feeling. How many con- trasts derived from old and new contents do we carry within ourselves, and what a great task lies before us if we are inwardly to master them !
In order to elaborate and harmonise these various tendencies a superior spiritual force is needful, but since this force is lacking we are subject to all the misfortunes that are the necessary consequences of man being overmastered by his own experiences, of his being dominated by the distracting influences of existence. No steady aims guide our endeavour, no simple ideas stand out above the chaos and liberate us from its doubt and confusion. On the contrary, we are overwhelmed by immediate impressions, and our life is disintegrated by their contradictions. So we are tossed about by every passing wave, the helpless victims of every bold assertion and pronounced conviction, as well as of our own whims and passions, the playthings of shifting moods and situations.
A peculiar tension is imparted to this state of afi'airs by the fact that the changes which we experience are ultimately reducible to a single question and bring us face to face with a solitary alternative, an alternative which permits of no obscuration and demands a decision on the part of the whole man. The quiet but continual and irresistible development of modern work has not only altered the traditional way of life in all its details, it has undermined it as a whole and made it
INTRODUCTION 25
untenable. Openly or tacitly, broadly or finely, sensuously or spiritually, the older type of thought treated man as the measure and central point of all, turned reality into a kingdom of human-like agencies and made the welfare of man the object of all activity. Modern work as a whole has fundamentally destroyed this anthropomorphism. The immeasurable enlarge- ment of the outer world, the discovery of inner necessities and objective relationships within man's own sphere, and a wide expansion of creative spiritual effort beyond the mere subject combine to make this absorption in the human unbearably narrow ; they awaken at the same time a burning desire for a wider, richer, freer being, a great thirst for a life in relation with the infinity and truth of the whole. These changes force themselves more and more upon the attention of humanity and imperatively demand a just recognition.
But this negation does not by any means lead directly to an affirmation. The breaking down is not accompanied by a building up. The new position opens up two possibilities which are directly opposed to one another and admit of no recon- ciliation.
Does this historical world-movement against absorption in the merely human mean that man must conceive of himself as a mere natural being and place all his thoughts and activities within the limits of nature? In that case everything that is distinctively and peculiarly human must be got rid of as a pernicious illusion, and all that gives meaning and value to our life must receive its laws and forms firom nature. Or does this movement affirm that a new world, a spiritual world, arises within man himself, raising him above himself as well as above nature ? Does man initiate a new stage of reality and can his spiritual life inwardly enlarge itself to form a world ? Our main task would then be to seize, appropriate and develop this world. In this case man must above everything else firmly establish himself in this position and direct his whole attention and effort not so much backwards as forwards. Thus man is either less or more than he is at the present day apt to conceive himself to be. A decision in this respect one way or the other will have the effect of transforming the whole of life from the
26 INTRODUCTION
smallest things to the greatest. But although this decision cannot be evaded, the lack of centralising force already referred to allows us to hesitate and vacillate, we tend now in this direction and now in that, according as the influences vary. While in general approving of the one we cannot make up our minds to abandon the other. We affirm in one direction what we deny in another. We are not whole-heartedly devoted to any one position. The situation has been often enough described ; its rapid shifting of tendencies and moods, its lack of logic (as revealed by an insensibility to the sharpest contradictions and the jumbling up together of quite different ranges of thought), together with its weakness in systematic thinking, in following up assertions, either in their preliminary assumptions or their consequences. In all these respects we perceive a serious lowering of the level of inner life, nay, an inner impoverishment of life in the midst of amazing peripheral progress, of undreamt-of technical accomplishments, of an overwhelming wealth of outward successes.
It is obvious that we are in the midst of a spiritual crisis which threatens to overwhelm us. But this situation has not arisen owing to the perversity or sceptical bias of individuals ; it is a result of the historical position as a whole. Have we not the right to hope that the necessity which produced such a crisis also vouchsafes us some sort of means capable of leading us beyond it ?
As a m-atter of fact there is no lack of opposition to this chaotic state of affairs. There are plenty of counter-movements, plenty of attempts to build up a uniform construction of life, a uniform conception of reality. But unfortunately these attempts remain for the most part under the influence of that which they would like to overcome. The age of self-conscious specialism which forgot to take any account of the whole through its absorption in endless detail has now passed its high-water mark. But the movement towards unity consisted at first mainly in this, that particular spheres of life and knowledge took over the whole and made of it a picture, each according to its particular impressions, experiences, and aims. More than ever before, each of these separate spheres produced within its
INTRODUCTION 27
own particular circle a compact system of knowledge and then, boldly pressing beyond the boundaries of this circle, endeavoured to capture the whole of reality. Each sphere put its own special tasks before all others and assigned universal validity to its concepts, standards, and methods. Thus each particular depart- ment became the dominating central point of the whole of reality : religion, and often art as well, constructed its own world, the social movement produced its own particular view of life, and in the intellectual sphere, the natural sciences, in particular, frequently expanded into all-embracing philosophies. The first to do so was zoology under the influence of Darwinism. Now we perceive the same attempt being under- taken by physics, physiology, &c. The tendency towards bold speculative thought has deserted the philosophers to find a home with the natural scientists ; in their case there is no lack of bold raids into the land of truth, and the com- mingling of philosophical assertion with capable research work prevents many people from realising the outrageous character of the speculative attempt.
Thus special points of view, partial conceptions of life, result, and their sensuous immediacy and easy comprehensibility gain them many adherents and enable each to attain a certain degree of influence. But never more than a certain degree. For the truth of things must eventually oppose and break through all narrow and arbitrary limitations. This will happen all the more readily in that the different claims involved in the various movements soon come into conflict, and dispute among them- selves concerning their respective rights. It now becomes apparent that the whole cannot well be built upon a part, and that truths which are valid as partial truths become erroneous when exaggerated into the whole truth. In so far as these part movements become influential and obstruct and counteract one another, they must increase the confusion which they are trying to remove. Perhaps nothing contributes so much towards division at the present time as these inefficient efforts towards unity. Never has monism been so talked of as it is to-day, and never has there been so much division !
28 INTRODUCTION
But in spite of the inadequacy of these attempts they are valuable for what they teach us. In particular, we clearly perceive from their failure that nothing can be accomplished by starting from this or that particular basis ; it is necessary to seek a unity beyond the dispersion of particulars. There is no hope of properly meeting the crisis unless we rise above the present situation as a whole and make a new beginning. But why should this be impossible ? History, in so far as it affects the inner life, does not exhibit a continual ascent. It shows us not only the rise and growth of true spiritual movements, but ensuing periods of exhaustion, so that we find recurring periods when the spiritual life must needs leave its active manifestation in human existence and retire into itself to take deeper and stronger root. In this fashion alone can it transcend the age and prove effective in liberating the truth present in the age from all the uncertainties which confuse and divide us. We are again face to face with such a period. Through self-recollection we must ascertain the foundations of our existence, our funda- mental relationship to the world. We must appeal from the mere age to the eternal in the age, from the mere man to the superior forces and laws which make man something more than a mere natural being.
Under these circumstances every one who is alive to the necessities of the age must work, according to his capacity, towards this goal, namely, the deepening of life and the renewal of human culture. The path which we propose to strike out in this work will be more particularly distinguished by three characteristics.
1. We shall in the first place turn our attention to the chief movements characteristic of the age, the leading spiritual and intellectual tendencies, as we may shortly describe them. We speak of movements or tendencies, rather than of concepts or ideas, in order to make it clear from the very beginning that it is not, in the first place, a matter of merely intellectual processes and that these are not the deciding factors. Although outwardly the conflict may rage chiefly in the intellectual sphere, yet behind this are great movements springing from life as a whole, with characteristic contents of reality and specific constructions of
INTRODUCTION . 29
life ; in the midst of manifold conflict and through a variety of difl"erent problems it is possible that under the influence of these deeper movements a common pulsation may stir the age ; so that in emphasising these vital pre-suppositions- of thought we are peculiarly likely to assist in forming a conception of the age as a whole, and winning clear recognition of its specific character. Moreover, accepting as we do a multiplicity of starting-points, we gain at least this advantage, that we make the assertions and problems of the age more demonstrable and more easily comprehensible. This plan has the further advantage of leading the discussion quickly to a definite point at which intrinsic necessities become apparent and are able to show our thought its paths of advance. The enquiry will show that at every point we come to the same questions, and indeed that one and the same central 'problem manifests itself through all the varieties of circumstance. It will also show that as the battle for the whole is being fought at each point, so the decision as to the whole is effective throughout all its ramifications. Furthermore, we shall be the better able to feel confidence in our own position the more the experiences and demands of the individual points of attack press towards it and point it out as the sole possibility of a happy solution.
2. On a closer examination we discover that each separate tendency asserts (or at any rate contains) a life-process, and this it is which we propose more especially to examine. Further, we shall be occupied in particular with the question whether this life-process permits of an independent spiritual life. The various tendencies usually recognise (if often unwillingly) that spiritual life possesses a certain actuality. But we are generally left in complete darkness as to what this involves and what it demands beyond the immediate phenomenon, to what pre- liminary suppositions and to what conditions it is attached. We shall devote our attention in the first place to finding out how the movements of the age are related to the problem of the possibility of spiritual life and to seeing what these tendencies contribute towards this problem. We shall endeavour not to lose ourselves in detail, but shall push forward rapidly to the life which flows through each movement, since this is the last
30 INTRODUCTION
point attainable and the point from which our thought-world must build itself up. Such a study of the life-process will bring us most surely to the point where the various problems in question become the personal experience of the individual, where he can most easily insert his personal experiences and can least easily escape personal decision.
3. When the content of the age forms the point of departure as well as the end in view, it is well to bring in a historical survey in support of the philosophical work. This has the effect, in the first place, of throwing light upon and more clearly defining the spiritual nature of the present by disclosing its growth and its relationships. In attempting to understand and value the dominating movements of the age it cannot be a matter of indifference whether we recognise in them merely temporary waves or enduring life-tendencies, whether the present experience has frequently been experienced before and has a recurring and rhythmic character, or whether it reveals something completely new, something unique, whether it is more an action or a reaction, more a pushing forward or a sliding back. The historical review will be more or less retro- spective according to the exigencies of the case. It will frequently be necessary to follow the chief phases of a movement throughout the whole development of European civilisation, but sometimes a study of the immediately preceding stage will suffice to throw light upon the present.
A brighter illumination of existing conditions in the light of history may prepare the way for independent investigation if it enables us better to perceive the specific nature of things, to become more clearly aware of their limits and to recognise them as problems. Not only the present-day position but the historical relationships themselves and history as a whole are converted into a problem through the discovery of the life-process operating in them. The life-process and its develop- ment cannot well be thrown into relief amidst the chaos of appearances until we transcend the historical outlook and take up a position from which a timeless and direct view is possible, when the question of the truth and justification of the process must be forced upon our attention. It is impossible to throw
INTRODUCTION 31
a clear light upon the whole unless original, personally- experienced, ultimate facts are distinguished from facts traditionally accepted. In this manner we may effect a revolution and turn towards a direct contemplation and analysis of the matter. This reversal, with its conversion of history into the development of a timeless life, alone makes it possible clearly to see through the content of our existence from the inside, to proceed from appearance to fact, from mere data to fundamental truth and to recognise inner necessities and per- sistent tendencies in the movement of history : nay more, to wrest any sort of meaning from the whole. It is only when thus viewed from the standpoint of permanent truth that the significance of the individual epochs can be measured and that an immanent criticism of the present day achievement can be made. The assertion of the age will be tested with reference to that stage in the world's spiritual evolution which it historically occupies. If history has already revealed more content and depth than this position can contain, then progress will neces- sarily be forced beyond it and at the same time it may receive guidance as to the direction in which it is to continue its quest. When philosophical work and the world's historical experience are thus brought into close contact, criticism does not need to remain retrospective and reflective, it can become productive and progressive, it can itself further the forward movement which it demands.
Such an investigation must try, in the first place, to de- stroy the matter-of-course character which is wont to attach to the movements of a given age and at the same time must aim at doing away with the dogmatism of which they are usually guilty. The first condition is to see more precisely what it is that the age undertakes and achieves. To see precisely, means in this case to see at the same time the extent of what has been accomplished, and this alone makes it possible to attain to a judgment which is independent and efiective, without being guilty of injustice or of substituting paradox for independence. Our chief aim is, then, to discover leading tendencies, simple fundamental lines of development amidst the multiplicity and apparent confusion of the various movements. And it is from
32 INTRODUCTION
this point of view that we may hope most readily to free the truth content of the age, its inner necessities, from the mis- leading addition of human error and passion, while at the same time gaining nuclei for our own efforts. Only those who are capable of inwardly experiencing the age can accurately judge it. No value whatever attaches to the opinions of those whose attitude towards the age is throughout merely captious and critical.
Finally, we may add that in this, as in the earlier editions of the book, the definitions of the chief concepts will receive care- ful consideration. The confusion of the present day is due in no small degree to the indefinite use of terms. When the same expression is used now in a strict sense, now in a loose one, it is easy for statements to acquire illicitly more solidity and con- tent than is really due to them, and when the same word frequently possesses essentially different meanings the aspect of things easily becomes chaotic and the central decisive point tends to be obscured. In every age the agreement between terms and concepts is no more than approximate, but to-day it is exceptionally loose. With the object of remedying this unfortunate state of affairs it is necessary briefly to review the history of the terms employed, so that we shall devote a little time to this topic.
A. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT OF SPIRITUAL LIFE
1. SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE
(a) Historical
The relation of subject to object is a problem which to-day stands in the very centre of philosophical work and controversy. Our views of life, our concepts of reality, our ideas of truth, nay, the main currents of life itself, vary according as it is the subject or the object which preponderates. In the one case the main trend of life's movement is fi'om man to world, in the other it is from world to man. All other problems lead back to this main issue, which as it confi-onts us to-day bears the impress of influences derived from every stage of the whole history of philosophy. The chief phases in this historical development must therefore be recalled, and as we study them we shall see that they embody the main alternative solutions of which the problem in question is susceptible. And we shall at the same time become aware of a continuous impulse constrain- ing the world's work to develop in a certain definite direction.
That the matter itself contains peculiar complications is sufficiently indicated by the remarkable history of the expres- sions subjective and objective. As the centuries have passed by their meaning has been completely reversed. Duns Scotus (d. 1308) first employed them as technical terms and in opposing senses : " The word subjective was applied to whatever concerned the subject-matter of the judgment, that is, the concrete objects of thought ; on the other hand the term objective referred to that which is contained in the mere ohicere {i.e., in the present- ing of ideas) and hence qualifies the presenting subject " (see Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, iii. 208). Philoso- phers employed the expressions in these senses until the seven- teenth and eighteenth centuries ; but the counter-term to
36 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
objective (which was more commonly used than subjective) was more often formaliter or realiter* The systems which carried on the scholastic philosophy show, at this period, a change in the use of objectivus which paved the way for the more modern terminology, f
The complete reversal of meaning did not take place, however, until the words were assimilated into the German language (through the Wolffian school of philosophy ; for example in A. F. Miiller's Einleihing in die pliilosophiscJie Wissenschaft, 1733 ; Baumgarten and Gottsched). At first the terms subjekti- visch and objektivisch (as they were then written) were not used outside this school, and in the conflict between Lessing and Goetze they were still employed only as highly technical words. It was Kantian philosophy which first brought them into common use, and at the beginning of the nineteenth century they were widely employed. It was entirely owing to German influence that their new meanings became general, and at first they w^ere frequently regarded as strange.
The exact significance of these terms in modern terminology, though distinct enough from that they bore in the Middle Ages, is in itself most uncertain, being swayed now by one influence, now by another. The first meaning of subjective is that which pertains to the mere individual act of presentation ; but it frequently means (especially when employed by scientists) any- thing and everything which a feeling and a thinking creature experiences in itself ; also all convictions extending beyond the immediate evidence of the facts are called subjective and are regarded as a species of mere trimming. Thus what is deepest
* In the discussions between Descartes and Gassendi there occur subjective {^= formaliter in se ipsis) and objective (= idealiter in intellectu). Bayle dis- tinguishes (auv. div. 1727, iii. 334a) ohjectivement dans notre esprit and reelle- ment hors de notre esprit, and even so late as Berkeley we find (Fraser's edition, ii. 477): "Natural phsBnomena are only natural appearances. They are, therefore, such as we see and perceive them. Their real and objective natures are, therefore, the same."
t Thus it occurs for example in Chauvins's lexicon rationale (1692) under certitudo : ohjectiva nonnullis est ipsa necessitas objecti, sen j/ropositio necessaria ohjectiva. Aliis autein nihil aliud est qnam denominatio quce sumitur ah actu intellectus per quern ubjectum reprcesentatur. Goclen {lex. philos., 1613) makes ratio ohjectiva = res ipsa quatenus dejinitioni respondet.
SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 37
and what is shallowest are treated as of equal value. The term objective is also ambiguous. Sometimes it refers to objects as contrasted with mental activity, sometimes as constitutive of mind itself. Goethe aimed at objectivity ; so does modern naturalism.
The problem itself is obviously concerned with the relation- ship between man and his thought-world, on the one hand, and the world in which he lives, on the other. In so far as thought is independent it stands apart from the world, but at the same time it can never forget that it belongs to the world and is always occupying itself with the world ; hence no sooner has a gap been made than there arises an imperative desire to bridge it over, to bring thought and the world together again and bind them to one another. But the more we occupy ourselves with this task the more complicated it appears. The ancient Greek world was keenly conscious of this complication, but was more able to master it than we moderns are in a position to do. The solution of this problem as attempted by the Greeks at the height of the classical j)eriod has had the j)rofoundest effect upon the history of philosophy. The position developed by such leading thinkers as Plato and Aristotle derived its power of conviction chiefly on account of having behind it a complete scheme of life and conduct. The peculiar strength and dis- tinguishing characteristic of the old Greek philosophy of life lay in its capacity for raising the primitive relationship between man and nature to a spiritual level. It ennobled the relationship, while at the same time it avoided any sharp separation. It assigned man a place in the world while retaining for him the purity of spiritual independence. Man and the world, the inner and the outer, had then reached the stage above the primitive one of identification, and yet they were not so sharply divided but that a spiritual connection between them could easily be demonstrated. For they both seemed of the same order of being and inwardly attached to one another; each needed the other as a complement in order to attain to its own perfection. Nature, filled with inner life, attained its greatest height when appropriated by man. The forces latent in the latter, on the other hand, could not be fully developed except by first coming
38 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
into contact with the worhl. In such a unification as was brought about by contemplation and love, life reached the height and blessedness of spiritual creation. From such a point of view as this it is possible, ^vithout misgiving, to conceive of truth as the conformity of thought with its object {adequatio intellectus et rei). But this view of the matter could only suffice for a stage of life when nature appeared more spiritual and humanity more natural than they subsequently did, when the one had not reached complete independence in virtue of its own distinctive laws and forces and the inner life of the other had not so deepened as to constitute a world of its own. There can be no doubt that this intimate connection between man and the world, and the accompanying fruitful reaction of each upon the other, helped to build up a joyous, high-minded, artistic type of human culture. But it is equally certain that this close union of spiritual life with a naive conception of the world could not be permanently maintained.
Even before the end of the classical period, the Stoics and the Neo-Platonists had attempted solutions on different lines, though these did not exert so great an influence over the Modern World as did the earlier type of thought. The latter experienced an important revival in the shape of mediaeval scholasticism, through which it directly influenced the Modern World (the characteristic features of which arose more particularly from its conflict with scholastic philosophy).
The new tendency first shows its influence in a powerful development of the suhject, in a defiant breaking away from environment, and in a bold attempt to build up a new world and reshape life by the sole agency of man and his thought, instead of seeking union with the world and adopting a receptive attitude towards it. Science altered the aspect of things in a more drastic manner than had ever before occurred. By rejecting everything which did not answer to its test, while illuminating and linking up that which remained, it brought the whole of human existence within the sphere of systematic thought, and raised it to the level of the thinkable, the conceptual, the ideal. The inner became conscious of its unity and entrenched itself within its own territory, while the outer world receded to occupy
SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 39
an inferior position, and lost all inner life, since its function of movement in space did not seem to need any spiritual principle. It also lost in colour and variety, because the whole range of sense properties was regarded, not as belonging to the objects themselves, but as a mere garment with which the spirit invested them. Thus nature came to be conceived of as a domain of lifeless matter and movement devoid of any inner connection with the soul ; while the latter, in its turn, was looked upon as entirely self-dependent, as standing by itself, master of a thought- force dominating eternity. The soul was thus placed upon an incomparably higher plane.
That is a great achievement — perhaps the greatest which the Modern World can boast of. But it does not constitute the whole of the activity of the period. The new period was unmis- takably characterised by another tendency, besides that making for a glorification of the subject; one that laid chief emphasis upon the vastness and grandeur of the external world and contrasted it with the pettiness of man ; a movement which aimed at replacing the hollowness, confusion, and narrowness of human existence by a wider, richer, and purer life, derived from contact with the immeasurable universe. It was a move- ment towards the object ; an endeavpur to sink humanity in the outer world, to assimilate the latter' s whole content with- out criticism. Salvation is thus awaited from experience, from a better acquaintance with the things of the external world. Man must not seek in any way to shape the world according to his own ideals. To base his life on truth he has simply to take his place in the cosmic scheme. Even the strengthening of the subject itself indirectly supports this movement, for the closer concentration of the subject in its own sphere and its consequent absorption of all those characteristics which it had, as it were, lent to the objects of the external world, paves the way to making an end of the ancient anthropomorphic view of life. Thus the object is left free to develop its own nature in complete purity and to link itself closer together in its multi- plicity until it is firmly welded into a complete whole. Now for the first time, the concealing veil being withdrawn, nature attains to full autonomy and is seen as a domain of faultless
40 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
sequences and inviolable law. In the first instance, all this works itself out as appertaining to an objective world, apart from man. But it is bound finally to come back to man, to surround him, to try to make an absolute slave of him. From this point of view it increasingly appears as if all independence on the part of the subject must be a hollow delusion ; it is claimed that life should willingly adapt itself to external things and place itself entirely under their direction. Hence humanity becomes very closely dependent upon environ- ment ; there ensues a new type of life, completely dominated by the object.
We thus perceive that the modern period is permeated by two distinct movements, each claiming the field for itself; it is hence inwardly divided, and a fundamental unrest and tension is brought into our life. This twofold character of the modern world reveals itself in most of the problems we are about to deal with, and presenting as it does a difficult but imperative task, summons us to spiritual action. Neither a unity transcend- ing this division nor an assured truth can be hoped for from the present situation, hence the latter must be developed further and a new groundwork of reality must be disclosed.
It was therefore no merely whimsical speculation, it was an inner necessity, which drove gi*eat thinkers to seek new paths and bade them oppose to the primitive view of life and the world a reality based upon thought.
Two of these attempts to express a new type of life are ol particular importance. With the object of overcoming the oppo- sition (between subject and object) Spinoza laid emphasis upon the object and Kant upon the subject. The former recognised and emphasised what is objective in the subject, the latter what is subjective in the object. Spinoza aimed at binding man and the world together by discovering a cosmic force in man and separating it from the merely human element : this force is thought, based upon nothing outside itself, governed by its own necessities, free from all connection with a sense environ- ment (as we see it, for example, in the region of mathematics). The petty human element, on the other hand, is a purely subjective experience limited to its own private aims and moods.
SUBJECTIVE- OBJECTIVE 41
The transition from such prejudice and narrowness to the clarity and breadth of thought opens up to man the possibility of a cosmic life : for since thought itself is conceived of as grounded within a universal life (which is also the basis of the external world), its processes correspond with the truth in all things, and are capable of directly sharing their eternal and infinite character. Knowledge thus becomes the soul of life and fulfils all our needs. In its perfected form it takes the shape of religion and artistic contemplation. It was thus, for the most part, artistic and contemplative minds that were attracted by the calm and arid greatness of this type of life. The effect of this tendency of thought made itself felt far beyond the circle of actual discipleship. It was seen in the cleavage of human nature into the cosmic and the merely human, and in an energetic resistance to the anthropomorphism both of thought and of feeling which had become so firmly estab- lished during the Middle Ages. Men came to realise more clearly the petty nature of the happiness they had coveted and the narrowness of the prevailing field of ideas, and once their insufficiency had been felt and brought home they could never again be accepted in the old uncritical way.
There still remains, however, the question, Does our whole spiritual life begin and end with thought? It is possible that the transition from the deceptive appearances of the senses to the truth of thought itself demands an act on the part of the whole man, an act lying outside the region of mere thought. Moreover, the assumption which underlies this solution (the harmony of our thought with the world about us, the compre- hension of both within a single cosmic life) is by no means free from doubt ; and when the cosmic character of our thought becomes uncertain the truth of the life it offers us is at once shaken.
This consideration also actuated Kant when he decided to follow an exactly opposite path. In his case the world of external things retires to an unattainable remoteness, and every possibility of verifying a correspondence with it disappears. Hence, if we are to retain any sort of truth at all, truth must be looked for within the subject itself, and not in a relationship
42 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
to the object. This amounts to a decisive negation. But Kant discovers a way from this negative to a positive ; he draws our attention to the great collective achievements within the sphere of human life, more particularly to the formation of a body of scientific experience and of a domain of moral action. The spiritual element in these achievements must be put to the credit of the subject, so that the latter, by itself, must outgrow its traditional form. It is now not so much a separate point, an individual existence, as a spiritual structure, a spiritual fabric. Its comprehension of itself and of its own activity thereby becomes valid for every individual, and there results a new kind of objectivity,* a new concept of truth. The pre- cise content depends upon the nature and significance of the activity, and is hence entirely different in the spheres of theoretical and practical reason. According to Kant, all human knowledge must remain confined to a world beyond which we cannot reach ; the thought-world that we develop (in response to the stimulus of the external world) is valid only for ourselves and our form of presentation ; our view of life does not range beyond ourselves ; the forms of thought, as well as those of sense perception, are and must remain merely human. But in the sphere of practical life the position is entirely difi"erent. Human action attains to complete originality and is held capable of evolving a world of its own. In this case truth ceases to be merely human and becomes absolute ; the charac- teristic feature is the subordination of all human particularity to universal norms. Man now comes into direct contact with the true essence of reality ; in its capacity of a moral being the subject itself becomes the upholder of a world. Morality thus becomes an independent sphere in the very centre of life.
* This new concept of objectivity is undoubtedly full of complications, and was sharply attacked by Kant's opponents. Thus Plattner, for example, says {Philosophische Aphorisinen I. § 699, Anmerkung) : " If, however, it is intended to be thereby demonstrated that our knowledge has objective validity, then one is certainly doing great violence to the term objective and employing it in a sense hitherto unheard of in philosophical terminology. It is being used to denote the precisely opposite concept, subjective. No wonder that Herr Schmid, who is never remiss in his devotion to truth, found it necessary to describe Kantian objectivity aa subjective objectivity (Worterbuch, article Objectiv)."
SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 43
Knowledge, on the other hand, withdraws to the periphery, its chief task being to guard the moral world from disturbance. The result is a new organisation of life in direct contrast to that propounded by Spinoza. Kant stands for activity, for the creation of a new world ; Spinoza for restful contemplation, for searching out the foundations of the world as it already exists. The former divides reality and intensifies every contrast, the latter smooths away contrasts within a comprehensive unity. The two are at one, however, in their desire to impart, in some way, a cosmic character to life, to lift man above himself and lead him on to deeper things.
Recent years have seen a revival of Kantian modes of thought, and the discussion of this topic will be left over to the study of the present day. The immediate followers of Kant were the sons of an age which abounded in a strong and joyous sense of life, and they took strong exception to the retention of the Ding-an-sich (the thing-in-itself, stripped of all that is sub- jective), and the consequent limitation of human capacity. Along with the Ding-an-sich disappeared the division between theoretical and practical reason, and there now remained no obstacle to the conception of life as a single connected whole. A spirited attempt was made to evolve all reality from the workings of the human spirit (more especially from thought conceived of as provided with inner movement). Plotinus had already shown that it is possible for thought to overcome the contrast between subject and object in its own sphere, by turn- ing round upon itself, by making thought itself the subject of thought. This only needed to be developed in all its conse- quences, to be freed from all reference to the mere individual and extended to the whole sphere of the world's history, to give as a result the Hegelian system ; a system which transformed the whole of reality into a self-development of thought, con- ceived of truth as the spirit's awakening to self-consciousness, and gave man the right of complete participation in this absolute truth ; he must, however, abandon all narrow subjectivity of opinion and follow the necessities of the thought-process alone.
This bold attempt not only took its own age by storm, but the manner in which it made every factor plastic and welded
44 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
together all the manifold elements of our experience made a deep impression upon the content of spiritual life. As soon as the first impetus lost force, however, a reaction was inevit- able. The free development of the philosophy served to reveal its limitations. Certain serious questions soon became unavoid- able. In the first place it was asked if the process did not involve a demand for something outside itself, since (as a spiritual process) it requires to be re-experienced, and for this purpose a fulcrum is needed lying outside the process itself. In the second place the question arose whether the exclusive transformation of life into thought would not deprive reality of all content and leave it a mere tissue of logical forms and formulae. Finally, it was asked whether the absolute character of human spirituality had not been too hastily conceded. Whatever may be the truth with regard to these points, the fact remains that this system was not so much defeated by philosophical opposition as forced into the background by the actual direction taken by life itself.
This brings us to the nineteenth century.
(b) The Nineteenth Century
No previous age had ever been so conscious of the problem of subject and object and of the contrast it involved as was the nineteenth century ; never before had the difficulty been felt so directly and over so wide a range of life. At the same time, scarcely anything new was attempted in the way of overcoming the antithesis. The constant recurrence to Kant sufficiently indicates this.
A very important movement, and the first with which we have to deal, is that which led humanity away from inner development and turned its attention towards the conquest of the visible world by the aid of natural and technical science and social and political work. Pursuing this path, man becomes closely riveted to the external world ; he looks for reality and truth solely from the concentration of his powers upon the world, and all life apart from external things comes to be regarded as a mere shadow and a vain show ; thus the centre of gravity of life shifts towards the objective and life finds its meaning in work occupied with.
SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 45
and conditioned by, external things. This work completely emancipates itself from the mere individual ; it develops an independent and very extensive network of relationships, and swells in volume so unceasingly that man becomes more and more a mere servant and tool. This tendency was first illustrated in the case of factory work, and then it spread rapidly into other spheres of life. The more human thought and effort were con- centrated upon joint tasks of an outward and visible character, the more unimportant became all that took place in the soul of the individual, the more his condition became a matter of in- difference, the more the subject came to be considered a mere cog in the vast machinery of the whole, a quantity to be set aside with impunity. A scientific expression of this tendency is to be found in the theory of Positivism (in so far as it is logically developed fi'om its own principles and not amalgamated with thought of a different type).
The tendency we have just indicated is still predominant. But humanity is becoming increasingly aware of its limitations. A growing feeling of hollowness forces itself upon us. Does not this bear witness to the irrepressibility of the subject and to the impossibility of denying ourselves all inner satisfaction ? An abrupt reaction in favour of the subject is consequently noticeable. The subject begins to regard itself and its condition as the most important factors in the situation ; there grows up a tendency to throw off all outward restraint, to make individual feelings the only criterion, and finally to bring life as far as possible into conformity with this standard. This reaction still exerts a wide influence in literature, art, and social life. It is, however, far too devoid of real content to be capable of overcoming opposition or of satisfying the human soul. All its appeals to individual forces cannot produce a connected inner life or a common truth, and in the end it leads back to the very vacuity from which it wished to free us. The nearest scientific representative of this subjectivism is psychologism, which endeavours to build up a thought-world founded directly upon the individual soul ; for a time, psychologism proved very influential, but it was rapidly followed by a reaction and it is now being realised with increasing clearness that it will never be
46 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
possible to attain to a science, to a domain of truth, if such an unstable foundation be employed.*
Outside the sphere of science, too, we are becoming increas- ingly conscious of the limitations of subjectivism ; at the same time, we cannot possibly return to an objectivity of the kind described above. Hence we remain in a painful state of division, while the antagonism between the claims of work and the interests of the soul threatens to grow more and more pro- nounced. This involves a disintegration of life, and it is impossible to accept it as a final settlement. Some method of bridging the chasm must be discovered.
There is no lack of efforts in this direction. The most influential attemi)t is that which aims at so inwardly broadening and strengthening the subject as to enable it to win a new insight into the universe, and with it a new life : this is to take place, in the main (though by no means completely), along Kantian lines. A movement of this description is to be met with in theology as well as in philosophy, the forms it takes in the two cases being different. In theology the movement attempts to set religious truth free from the uncertainties of speculation and metaphysics and to place it upon a firm basis in the very centre of the soul's being. (We are here referring more particularly to the line of thought associated with the name of Ritschl.) Especially in the sphere of morality, in the development of moral personality, spiritual life seems to produce a kingdom of its own and to enthrone itself in a position of security and elevation above other phases of existence. According to this trend of thought, that which is necessary to spiritual self-pre- servation needs no outward support. Its veracity is inwardly demonstrated by the enrichment of ethical and religious life. The more exact development of the thought-world, in this case, depends chiefly upon the Werturteile (judgments of value), which represent this central relationship to life and are consequently
* The most effective refutation of psychologism is that contained in Husserl's Logischen Untersuchungen, 1900 and 1901. The profound influence which psychologism has exerted even upon investigators who are opposed to it on principle is here demonstrated in the most convincing manner and forma an important feature of Husserl's work.
SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 47
superior to all forms of theoretical proof. The moral and religious life, following its own internal necessities, produces a body of convictions, which does not, however, claim to be a cosmic philosophy, and only maintains its validity by continu- ally relating itself to the fundamental realities of the ethico- religious life.
This movement (which in its more detailed exposition takes very different forms) is undoubtedly justified in so far as it aims at providing a firmer and more direct foundation for men's ulti- mate convictions than intellectual argument is capable of offering, and in so far as it tends towards imparting a more practical character to life. But the manner in which this is attempted fills us with misgiving. Feeling is generally regarded as the core of life, and the attempt is made to raise a philo- sophical structure upon this basis : " Feeling is that spiritual function in which the ego finds its self-immediacy" (Ritschl : Christ, Lehre von der Rechtfcrtigung u. Versohnung, iii. 142). But can it be truly said that life wins self-immediacy through feeling ? Is not feeling sometimes hollow and empty ? Feeling alone cannot evolve a content ; it acquires one in its relation- ships with the rest of life. Since feeling is liable to constant alteration and is open to all sorts of different interpretations, it is impossible, with it as a basis, to impart either stability or content to life. The attempt to construct a thought-world with the feeling subject as basis would hardly be distinguishable from mere subjectivism if the feeling were not represented as being a necessity and the content which it affirms as something elevated above what is merely natural, human and particular. But how can this structure be erected upon the basis of the bare facts of the soul -life? However imperative a feeling may seem to be, it is so, primarily, only for a particular subject ; however closely it may seem bound up with a particular content, the connection signifies more than is contained in the direct im- pression ; it is the result of an interpretation — which may be a wrong one. Consequently the strength of a feeling is no guarantee whatever of the truth of any body of thought which may be developed from it. Among other things, the prevailing diversity and conflict of religious opinion illustrates this point.
48 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
Each religion is confident of the entire genuineness of the fundamental feelings associated with it ; yet the various reli- gions arrive at quite different truths. Thus a higher tribunal is necessary to decide between these conflicting claims, and feeling cannot act in this capacity. Man cannot arrive at truth at all unless there is born within him a life elevated above his natural particularity and individuality ; truth bound down to such limitations as these is no truth. It follows as a corollary that man can never under any circumstances abandon, or even set aside, the problem of his fundamental relationship to reality. This problem is not one forced upon him through after- reflec- tion ; from the very beginning it forms a portion of his spiritual nature. The life of a spiritual being does not begin and end with its subjective condition ; it includes the objective also, and must get into relationship with the objective ; it is driven to insist that the rift between subjective and objective shall be overcome, and feels confinement to the merely subjective condi- tions as an intolerable restriction.
The complications which the Ritschlian tendency involves are very easily forgotten, because the excitation of feeling is usually supplemented by a thought-world that has come down to us as historical tradition, and this imparts a greater appear- ance of stability and content. As a matter of fact, the truth of the historical tradition has first to be demonstrated, and from this point of view that can only be done through the agency of feeling ; feeling, too, must decide what portions of the content of this tradition are to be counted valuable ; thus, pursuing more or less devious paths, we continually come back to feeling and find that we are confined within its sphere ; the more we assign complete independence to feeling, the less content it is capable of off"ering us and the more it threatens to split up into a number of isolated states bereft of meaning. Hence this method serves rather to increase our perplexities than to diminish them. However far we may hold ourselves aloof from this mode of thought, we cannot avoid recognising the invigora- tion of moral and religions life which has sprung from its adoption. But with the theoretical formulation of these con- victions we cannot pretend to be satisfied.
SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 49
In the sphere of philosophy the matter takes on an essentially different complexion. The concept of value * is now placed in the centre of an important and fruitful movement. Regarding it as a whole, this movement represents the modern type of thought as opposed to the antique (more particularly in so far as the latter is Platonic). When the chief antithesis of reality is that between a permanent " being " and a transitory "becoming" (as in the latter case), it is only a short step to conceiving this essential being as at the same time the good and valuable, thereby uniting the two concepts so far as this is possible. From this point of view the good can be regarded as detached from all activity and quite independent of all that is human. Modern thought, on the other hand, maintains that there can be no question of a good apart from a living and active being, and that the good can have value only in proportion to its im- portance for life. Hence it seems more appropriate to speak of " values " than of "goods." This fundamental idea can and does assume different forms. If the individual subject with its
* Within the last few decades an extensive literature has sprung up dealing with the concept and significance of value. It will not be possible here to review or estimate this : we will merely mention Meinong's Psychologisch- ethische Untcr&iwhiim]en zur Wert-Theoric (1894). It would be desirable to have a history of the problem and concept of value as a whole. At present we will quote only the following passages from Hoffding's Philosophy of Religion : "We are indebted to Kant's philosophy for the independence of the problem of value as apart from the problem of knowledge. He taught us to distinguish between valuation and explanation." Further, " Kant more often speaks of pur- poses than of values. It is, however, clear (although Kant does not properly pay attention to it either in his psychology or his ethics) that the concept of purpose presupposes the concept of value, since I could not make a purpose of anything the value of which I had not already experienced. When Kant speaks of the ' domain of purposes ' in contrast to the causal order of nature, he means thereby what later philosophers called the ' domain of values.' Kant's disciple Fries began with the concept of value (System cler Philosoi)hie, Leipzig, 1804, §§ 238, 255, 330; Ncue Kritik der Vcrmmft, Heidelberg, 1807, iii. 14. It was more especially Herbart and Lotze, however, who procured recogni tion for the concept of value in wider circles. After Lotze, the theologian Albrecht Eitschl and his pupils took up the concept." Poschmann has recently published a work upon Fries' concept of value. The concept and the problem associated with it, is, however, by no means exclusively modern ; it appears whenever the subject attains to greater mdependence. Thus it first appears among the Stoics, who constructed a term for it (aKia). Nicholas of Cusa, the first modern thinker, called God the value of values {valor valoruvi).
4
50 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
sensitivity and feeling is made the sole basis of life, if all events are valued according to their contribution towards the comfort of the subject, and if it is considerations of pleasure and pain which decide in the last instance, it is impossible to see how this movement can in any way elevate or enrich life. For pleasure binds man down to his own unilluminated subjective feeling, and in spite of all outward success it narrows the inner life. It is inimical to any inner elevation of life, to any direct joy in men and things, to any vital assimilation of the objective. Such defects will be felt as peculiarly grievous by those who realise the great tasks and complications which are associated with man's spiritual condition ; for this condition demands an upward effort, nay an inward conversion, and these are im- possible if life remains rigidly bound down to a mere subjective condition.
There is another mode of thought, standing on an incom- parably higher level, according to which Kant's critical idealistic method is transferred to a present-day basis and an attempt is made to develop it in the light of post-Kantian experience.* A start is made from the fact that our life and action does not exhaust itself in the mere blind immediacy of events ; our spiritual nature compels us to make continual use of our judg- ment. Now we form judgments according to definite standards, which neither fancy nor failure in any way affects. In these standards are revealed values above all mere utility and above pleasure and pain. These values bring about an inner elevation of life and may justly claim to possess an absolute character.! We have here to deal with an important endeavour to provide human life with a basis and content derived from within, to raise it above natural impulses by the aid of critical self- contemplation without entangling it in the difficulties of specula- tive metaphysics, and at the same time to map out a specific task for philosophy. As a matter of fact, it cannot be seen how
* This movement is dealt with in a particularly clear and noteworthy manner in Windelband's Prdludien, more especially in the sections Was ist Philosophie ?, Normen und Naturgesetze, Kritische oder genetische Methode.
f Miinsterberg, in particular, voices this superiority of the values in his Philosophie der Werte (1908), a warm and powerful exposition of the subject.
SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 51
man can overcome the threatened division of life arising from the breach between subject and object save by recollecting his spiritual nature and seeking to deepen it.
There is only one point with regard to which we cherish doubts. Is it possible to regard the matter as concluded when it has reached this point? Is there not an inner necessity which will compel the movement to go further? In this connection several queries suggest themselves. Is it possible for the values to attain a sufficiently secure position while remaining separate experiences? Will not their ultimacy be open to attack so long as they remain in mere juxtaposition and do not join together to make a united whole ? * Further, will the higher grade of life revealed in the values be able to rise up against and prevail over the entangling and enslaving power of natural and social self-preserving tendencies, unless it create for us a new spiritual self which unfolds and asserts itself in the values ? But this is hardly possible without reversing the posi- tion of things as they now are, and thus we come back again to some sort of metaphysics, however different from the old type.
The doctrine of values hence appears to us to be a very promising and suggestive movement rather than a complete solution. For the time being this movement does not exert much influence outside the sphere of philosophy, and humanity remains painfully wavering between work and soul, between the absorption of the subject by a too powerful object and the dissipation of the object by a too self-sufficient subject.
The complications of this situation give rise to the question, Is not this whole division between the subject and object a mistake ; is it not a mistake to recognise an inner domain existing parallel with the external world? May we not say that in the light of such a conception as this the aspiration towards truth involves an insoluble contradiction — for it wishes
* The necessity of such a connection is also emphatically brought forward by Miinsterberg ; he says in the preface to his Philosophie dcr Werte, " The values as a whole must be fundamentally tested and uniformly deduced from a basal act. Our modern philosophy lacks a self-contained system of pure values. Only when this has been obtained can philosophy again become a real life-power, a position which has too long been exclusively occupied by natural science " (vi.).
52 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
at the same time to divide and to unite, to keep apart and to draw together. Of recent years Avenarius and Mach, starting from quite opposite points of view, have come to the identical conclusion that this division should be abandoned as a useless and misleading duplication. The placing of a sensation in an inner world (introjection) seems quite as mistaken as the placing of processes in consciousness in an outer one (projection). These writers give us one world instead of two, and they forbid us to seek for objects beyond the reach of our immediate experience.* This penetrating treatment of the problem, by virtue of its simplifying tendency, has made a visible impression upon our age, but it is beyond the scope of our present task to examine it on its technical side. It is certainly to its credit that, in a sphere bordering on its own, namely, with regard to the physio- logico-psychological theory of perception, it again opens up questions that seemed to be settled and exposes the problemat- ical character of the conventional scientific conception of nature. We are prevented, however, from assenting to the main thesis by the consideration that our ego is in reality more than a current of sense impressions — our very knowledge is shaped in its attainment by our independent work. Moreover it is neces- sary to call particular attention to the fact that above and beyond all intellectual processes there develops an inner life, a life which exhibits, in spite of all manifoldness, a permanent character, persisting through all changes and movements, t The
* See Mach, Die Analyse der Empjindungen, 2nd edit., p. 206 : " There is no gap between psychical and physical, no outside and inside, no sensation which corresponds to something external and different from itself. There are only elements of one kind, of which the supposed outer and inner are compounded ; according to the circumstances of each particular case, these elements are found inside or outside. The sense-world belongs at the same time to the physical sphere and to the psychical." Page 33 : "I see no contrast between psychical and physical, but simple identity with regard to these elements." See also Wlassak (in Zukunft, 1902, No. 18, p. 202) : " No unsophisticated person finds a tree present in any sense as sensation in his consciousness ; such a person will invariably regard it solely as a portion of his environment. This also applies when the tree is not seen, but only recollected ; the less vivid image, also, stands in exactly the same relationship to the person perceiving it as did the tree itself."
t When Mach denies the independence and permanence of the ego, this is largely due to the fact that he confuses the consciousness of the ego with the
SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 53
whole course of history testifies to such an independence on the part of the inward life ; right through all his work and the complexities of his development man has always drawn further and further away from the mere life of the senses ; he has more and more converted outward events into inner experience, more and more resisted the mere influx of sensations. All this is no mere intellectual phenomenon, no mere attempt at explanation. It is an unfolding of rich actuality, the nearest and surest of which we have any knowledge, and this alone teaches us how mentally to shape and reshape our sense impressions. It is impossible to explain away such actuality as this as a mere illusion and set back the clock of history. It is equally im- possible to escape from the necessity of this division between subject and object, between the inner world and nature.
(c) The Positive Position
1. Introduction
In which direction shall we pursue our enquiry? If this division is inevitable, and if there is no bridge from the one
living ego itself. Thus, for example, on p. 3 : " The apparent permanence of the ego consists in the first place only in the continuity, in the slow change. The basis of the ego is made up of the various thoughts and plans of yesterday which are continued to-day and are constantly being recalled to us by our waking environment (hence, in dreaming, the ego may be very confused or doubled or totally lacking), and the little habits which long remain with us, uncon- sciously and involuntarily. It would hardly be possible for there to be greater differences in the egos of different men than appear in the course of a year in one man. When, to-day, I look back upon my early youth, if the chain of recollection were not present to my mind, I should have to believe (apart from a few special points) that the boy was another individual." And on p. 17 : " One will no more set such a high value upon the ego, which is subject to many changes even during the individual life, and in sleep or during absorption in contemplation or in some thought (precisely in the happiest moments) may be partially or totally absent." But is there not a unity of a spiritual kind which persists with living force in the face of all the changes and obscurations of consciousness, does not all progressive scientific and artistic creation work through this unity of the spiritual individuality, and is not this same unity the source of all thoroughgoing achievement also in the practical and technical domain? As opposed to this dissipation of the ego, these experiences of the spiritual life corroborate Goethe's conviction :
" Und keine Zeit und keine Macht zerstilckelt Gepragte Form, die lebend sich entwickelt.^^
54 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
side to the other, then no course remains to us but to accept the opposition as part of the life-process itself, and so to enlarge the latter, inwardly, that it need no longer be referred by a belated movement of thought to some outlying environment, but contains within itself a world. A whole world must come into effective activity within man himself; a world raised above this contrast, a world directly accessible to us and not refracted through the particularity of the individual medium. Then, and only then, can there be any truth for man.
To take up such a position as this may at first sight appear somewhat extraordinary. But in reality it is not without his- torical connections which only need to be correlated for the old which is contained in the apparently new to become obvious. How did humanity come to develop the ideas of the good and the true, and to separate them from mere utility and mere actuality ? How is it possible for humanity to rise in any way above the opinions and inclinations of the mere man ? It cannot be denied that we have here a remarkable phenomenon to deal with. We may differ as much as we like as to what is true and what is good, but it remains a fact that we do ask after the good and the true, however uncertain our answers may be. And this is in itself an important fact, rich in consequences. It involves breaking through the mere details of actual ex- perience ; it bears witness to an inward breadth of our being, which perceives and seeks its own in what is apparently foreign to it. For it is certain that man cannot be earnestly con- cerned about something that has no manner of relationship to his life and being — which does not in fact belong to him. He cannot possibly be interested, even in the slightest degree, in what is entirely external to him. Now in seeking the true and the good, man seeks a world outside his own immediate sphere. Must we not then, according to our very nature, participate in a wider sphere, must not our life contain the whole world, if we are so powerfully attracted and so excited to activity by its content ? It is true that in this case we must alter the concept of ourselves. But concepts must be sub- ordinate to facts, not facts to concepts ; therefore why should we resist such an alteration ?
SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 55
To give a more definite shape to this idea of the world-nature of man remains a very difficult task. But in this respect, as in others, the most notable philosophical work of recent centuries has clearly enough shown us the way. One of Kant's greatest achievements was the separation of the enquiry into the possi- bility of spiritual contents from the mere psychological explana- tion. For example, he distinguished between the question, How does the individual man arrive at knowledge, morality, &c. ? and the question, Upon what inward conditions does the existence of science and morality depend ? Thus, both the ethical and logical points of view become independent of the psychological. At first this may appear to be nothing more than a new method ; but this method would fall to the ground in the absence of a new life beyond the detached experiences of our merely psychical existence — a life issuing from the whole of things, a cosmic life. The specialised developments of such a life possess, however, no firm and stable basis if they do not reconcentrate the whole within themselves. They must be recognised as heralding a new stage of cosmic development which supervenes not below but above the opposition between subject and object.
Modern art, as seen in its most important manifestations, moves by another path towards a similar goal. We admire the objectivity of a Goethe, and when Heinroth described his thought as objective, the master himself expressed his apprecia- tion of the tribute. Such an objectivity does not in the least mean the suppression and absorption of the subject by the object, the mere reproduction of the outward impression made by a thing. It involves a meeting of objective and subjective upon the common ground of the inner life and the permeation of each by the other. The things themselves thus receive a soul and become capable of accurately recommunicatiug their own real nature, while human life receives a content in place of its original emptiness. In this case the things are not coloured, as it were, with a subjective mood; they are made to yield up their own true meaning. The poet "thereby appears as a magician bringing the otherwise dumb beings to speech ; to his soul the whole infinitude of the world is revealed, and he
56 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
enables all manifoldness to realise its own specific nature, at the same time perceiving all that is living, essential, and effective in the things themselves." (See Problem of Human Life, p. 472.) Goethe calls this a synthesis of spirit and world, " giving us a most blessed assurance of the eternal harmony of existence " ; in reality this synthesis does not take place between the soul and the external world, but within a soul enlarged to the dimensions of an inner world, between sides and poles of its life. Hence there are not merely two kinds of artistic creation , but three ; in addition to the contrasting subjective and objective treatments, there is a superior method which we have called a " sovereign " or supreme method. (See The Truth of Religion, trans, by Dr. Tudor Jones, published by Williams and Norgate.) This sovereign treatment alone rises above both soulless objectivity and formless subjectivity. It occupies a position of its own, according to w'hich the life- process does not seek a world which has evolved independently of it, but evolves one out of itself. Only thus can it obtain a content — by means of the creative synthesis of a new world, not by copying an already present existence. Should not that which possesses such indisputable reality in the sphere of art be valid also for spiritual life as a whole ? Could art concern itself about this matter at all if some spiritual totality did not stand behind it ? Hence we should confidently follow the path thus indicated to us, and bravely persevere in it to the end, however far it may lead us away from the usual conception of life and the cosmos. For there is no doubt whatever that it is only by opposing the customary conception that it is possible to build up a world from within and to impart a distinctive form to our life and work.
Let us consider the following three problems from this point of view, and see to what results we are led : —
1. The fundamental concept of the spiritual life.
2. The relationship between man and the spiritual life
(with a historical review).
3. The problem of truth.
We shall thus develop the preliminary assumptions of that to which (in its results) every man must in some fashion hold fast.
SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 57
2. The Fundamental Concept of the Spiritual Life
Life of a spiritual nature is considered to be a distinguishing characteristic of man. This life it is which raises him above the level of the merely animal Avorld ; it must therefore be something more than that natural life of the soul which he pos- sesses in common with animals. As a matter of fact, even a superficial consideration immediately shows us an essential difierence. In the animal world mental life is nothing more than a derivative phenomenon accompanying the nature-process and serving its ends ; skill and intelligence, however highly developed, are nothing more than mere tools employed in the preservation of the individual or the race. Being a mere tool, intelligence cannot attain to inner continuity, secure self- dependence, or any content of its own. But it is just these things which are characteristic of the spiritual stage of life. A new life-process now appears ; the inner, formerly occupying a modest position on the outskirts of a strange world, now claims to stand alone and to construct a reality of its own. From this point of view, spiritual life, united together to form a whole, may be looked upon as inner life which has become independent and acquired a content. Reality, otherwise split up in an im- measurable multiplicity and ensnared in countless dependent relationships, here attains an inner continuity and a life which alone can really be called a self-life.
A statement of this sort at once gives rise to a question. Is this self-life directed towards forming a separate domain of its own, apart from external reality, in isolated security and con- tentment, or does it still retain a connection with the world as a whole ? Only the latter view corresponds with the conditions of life. For in working to realise itself, spiritual life is still occupied with the world. It cannot find itself without drawing the world to itself. It can have no rest until it has completely overcome the world and assimilated it. Therefore its whole con- tent is at the same time a positive assertion ; it claims to be the last, the whole, the all-containing, the core of the whole of reality. But this cannot be true unless the further development which it brings about in things, through assimilating them,
58 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
leads these things to the height of their own being, unless the content of spiritual life signifies the reality of the things them- selves. Spiritual life becomes in itself an intolerable contradiction if it stands apart from and confronting the world and not within it, and if reality does not perfect itself in turning to spiritual life.
The recognition of this renders our world fluid and transforms it into a region of upward movement. The lower stages are formed by nature, from which the natural soul-life springs. This natural life exhibits a thoroughgoing contradiction ; it develops a certain inner life which is at the same time stultified through complete dependence on an outward life, through the denial of any self-life. Every thoughtful observer must see over- whelming evidence of this contradiction in the great cycle of animal life, so senseless, so devoid of meaning in spite of its wealth of life and feeling. Spiritual life marks the commence- ment of the solution of this contradiction, since life is now directed inwards towards itself and not merely outwards.
Since it thus forms a stage in the life of the whole, spiritual life cannot be a mere property of separate points, an aggi*egate produced by subsequent combination on the part of separate manifestations ; it must rather be a whole from the very com- mencement, an independent and self-contained life. Such a whole possesses a unity which transcends all manifoldness, and hence the contrast between subject and object. This whole develops itself through the agency of the antithesis of subject and object, of power and resistance, but it remains superior to it, and holds both sides together even while they are divided ; in the spiritual sphere, neither side can develop itself and find its own highest level without the assistance of the other. It is not really so much a question of opposition between the two sides as between the position of unity, of complete activity, on the one hand, and the position of division, of one-sided and empty life, on the other. From the point of view of spiritual life, the mere subject is just as much an outward thing as is the object. It is not the relationship of the one side to the other, but the creative synthesis alone, that produces an inwardness and at the same time a complete and self-contained reality. Such a reality can never come from without.
SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 59
It will not be possible to overcome the contradiction between subject and object in this manner if we begin with a given state of being. It is an indispensable condition that we should start with the life-process itself. If the former course be followed, then either the world or the subject is fixed upon as self-existing and self-contained ; it then becomes impossible to pass from the one to the other, and we remain under the dominion of an ever- lasting antithesis. Within the life-process, however, each can, from the very beginning, be related to the other, and the con- dition of each side can be measured by comparison with what takes place and is accomplished in the whole ; then the stubborn contrast disappears and the division is replaced by a superior connection.
A word of historical explanation may serve to elucidate and define this conception of spiritual life. The Enlightenment recognised, side by side with the mechanism of nature, no reality other than the juxtaposition of separate souls ; there was no mention of a spiritual world — only of a world of spirits. Kant was the first to originate the tendency which dominated the spiritual work of the nineteenth century, namely, the recognition of a spiritual life as distinct from the mere workings of the soul ; for according to Kant we have to deal with a common and fundamental spiritual structure, superior to all merely individual diflerences ; this forms a network embracing every spiritual manifestation, dominating it, and giving it its characteristic shape. But the matter was not carried to completion, the new material was not welded together to form a compact and inde- pendent whole, and the spiritual was not clearly defined. Kant's speculative followers elevated the spiritual life to a position of complete independence, but at the same time they unhesitatingly treated human spiritual life as absolute, and regarded it as the parent of all reality. They could not very well do this without replacing spiritual life as a whole by some special activity, and they came to rely more and more upon thought. A conception of the world resulted which was far too narrow and too anthropomorphic, while reality threatened to practically vanish by becoming a mere restless process.
Spiritual life, on the contrary, is definitely raised above human
60 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
existence. Man does not originate spiritual life, but be is capable of attaining to participation in it, and at the same time in a higher stage of reality. Spiritual life does not appear as a sj)ecial manifestation, as a special aspect of life, but as self-contained life, itself giving rise to reality ; a life which our human activity is far from penetrating, but towards which it strives as a great goal.
3. The Relationship between Man and the Spieitual Life
When spiritual life thus becomes independent and elevates itself above what is merely human, the relationship between man and spiritual life ceases to be an apparently obvious fact and becomes a difficult problem. How can man, who at first appears to be an infinitesimal point, participate in a self- contained world, in a world as a whole, such as the spiritual life now represents ? It is certain that he can only do so if the spiritual life has existed within his being, as a 'possibility, from the commencement, if it is in some way directly connected with him. It will not do for spiritual life to be communicated to him through the medium of his special nature (thus becoming alienated from itself) ; it must in some fashion be present to him as a whole in all its infinity ; it must hence, working from within, open up to him (if at first only as a possibility) a cosmic life and a cosmic being, thus enlarging his nature. In the absence of such an indwelling spirituality humanity can have no hope of making any progress. If in laying hold of spiritual life he did not discover his own true self, the former could never be a power to him. If spiritual life did not present an unchanging pole, if it was not an arbitrating power assigning goals and standards to all human undertakings, man would be a helpless victim of ever-changing appearances and would never be able to attain to any truth ; spiritual life alone, and not mere humanity, can ensure absolute constancy. This participation of man in spiritual life alters the whole aspect of his being. It only becomes possible by going beyond immediate human existence, so that man's life acquires a deeper spiritual basis. At the same time there separates itself from the empirical psychological method
SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 61
(which concerns itself with the immediate processes of the soul- life) a noological method which has to do with the above spiritual basis and its self-activity.
In this twofold aspect, man appears to be in himself a problem and a contradiction. In his case, a spiritual life is at the same time a fact and a task, a repose that can never be disturbed and an endeavour that cannot be satisfied, an inward core and a remote goal ; man himself appears great in his relationship to spiritual life, but small as an isolated individual ; his life becomes an incessant search after his own being, and in this sense alone can it give rise to true history. How could there be such a thing as genuine history if all effort was solely depen- dent upon external causes and was not directed and governed from within by a definite purpose ?
The sphere of human history illustrates the gradual over- coming of original disintegration and helplessness by spiritual life. This occurs through a species of crystallisation, which, under exceptionally favourable circumstances, may occur within the life-process ; complexes of spiritual activity join up together and endeavour to assert their supremacy through the construc- tion of a characteristic system of life, an edifice of spiritual reality. There is no better example of this than Greek creative thought in its characteristic comprehension of life and the uni- verse ; a synthesis of this sort stands for the exclusive truth of its particular life-content and divides existence into " For" and "Against." It cannot endure anything that is strange or hostile. Thus movement and conflict are produced, and these lead to experiences which drive life forward ; the way is paved for new concentrations, which in turn experience the same fate. In such fashion, through the growth and decay of the separate phases, the content of truth as a whole continues to grow. But this holds good only if all movement is comprehended within a basic and directing spiritual life ; in the absence of the latter there would be no possibility of securing the prevalence of any sort of truth whatever in face of the obstinate resistance and numerous barriers which human conditions offer. From this point of view the historical process appears as a progressive development of inner life — of a substantial, not a subjective kind. This involves
62 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
an ever-increasing separation from the immediate situation of humanity, dominated as it is by contradiction, and hence devoid of either complete inwardness or true reality.
There is also a place within this movement for that con- tradiction which is so inadequately described by the expressions " subjective " and " objective," Spiritual life is at the same time self-life and cosmic life ; a self unfolds and becomes a cosmos, while the cosmos gains a self — each belongs to the other. In spite of this mutual relationship the fact remains that in the historical process life tends sometimes more towards concentration, sometimes more towards expansion ; now we see an aspiration towards inner life and a deepening of the self, now a desire to attain width and sink the self in outward things. On the one hand we have the danger of an invasion of life by merely human elements, on the other of its domination by a soulless world. Perhaps there is a periodicity, now one tendency taking the lead, now the other. But right through every species of change persists the movement of spiritual life towards a unity transcending contradiction. A subjective or objective tendency within the spiritual life is fundamentally different from a subjective or objective tendency as opposed to spiritual life : the latter represents a subjectivity which aims at constructing a world from the standpoint of the mere subject and an objectivity which fancies it can attain to a truth in mere things by an elimination of the spiritual element. Both these tendencies must rapidly sink into nothingness unless they surreptitiously draw upon that superior spiritual life which they refuse to recognise.
4. The Ebsults as they affect the Concept of Truth Whatever transformations are thus effected must exert an influence upon the concept of truth and impart some character- istic alteration to its form. Truth no longer signifies an agreement with an external object, but an upward movement towards a life superior to all human desire or subjectivity ; a life which, through active creation, comprehends the antithesis between subject and object. We are now concerned with a transformation of existence into self-activity, which, with its
SUBJECTIVE— OBJECTIVE 63
reshaping capacity, is essentially different from all mere manifestation within a given existence. This striving towards truth has nothing to do with any passive state of being existing independently of all life ; rather does reality lie within life, attainable only through life. This life that we are now discussing is, however, no merely human affair, for it represents the independent self-life of the whole of reality, which here alone attains to contents and values. Truth is not a mere means for the enhancement of this life : truth forms a part of its being. All intellectual truth that is such on principle, rests ultimately upon a spiritual truth as a whole, and all essential progress in the knowledge of truth upon a widening and extension of life. Truth cannot be obtained at any one moment. Man gradually penetrates into its depths as a result of the great work of universal history as it goes on from age to age with its experiments, experiences, and transformations. It would hardly be possible to conceive of anything more foolish than the claim set up by certain philosophical systems to exhaust, at a given period, the whole wealth of truth and to solve every riddle. That we remain thus in a state of quest, and at the same time, unavoidably, in error, cannot in any way disturb us if we possess the conviction that all human effort has a world of spiritual life behind it which can be ours only through freedom, but which is independent of our self-will.
2. THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL
(INTELLECTUALISM— VOLUNTARIvSM)
(a) Historical
The question we have just dealt with is very closely connected with the present one of intellectualism and voluntarism. But here the discussion takes a more directly spiritual turn, while formerly it was concerned with the relationship of man to the cosmos. Here, too, we have contrasting types of life; here, too, a movement thousands of years old.
An important difference is that our own age approaches the present problem in a spirit of greater confidence. With us the tendency to lay the chief emphasis in life upon will, as that which alone can give life warmth, power, and firmness, is undoubtedly preponderant. How has it come to pass that such an ancient source of division so suddenly finds us united ? Let us see if history can offer any explanation.
The terms intellectualism and voluntarism are of quite modern origin. The former is first met with in the philosophical con- flicts of the early nineteenth century : for example, in Schelling's Bruno (Werke, iv. 309) it is employed as the opposite of materialism. Voluntarism is as recent as the last few decades.* The expressions practical and theoretical, on the other hand, can be traced back to the zenith of Greek philosophy.
* This term was constructed by Tonnies, who wrote about it as follows in the Viennese Zeit (March 23, 1901) : " These terms {i.e. Voluntarismus and volun- taristisch) were first made use of by the author of this article Ln his treatise, Zur Entwickelungsgesrhichte Spinozas (Spinoza's History of Evolution) in the Vierteljahrsfchrift fUr wissenachaftliche Philosophie, 1883. Wundt took them from Paulsen (who soon adopted them) and brought them into use through his authority. The concept of ' voluntaristic ' psychology has become more and more widely current."
64
\
THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL 65
Aristotle first contrasts theoretical and practical reason (vovq dewpijTiKog and TrpaKTiKog) : the former's task is to know the world as a whole with its eternal laws, while the latter con- cerns itself with merely human and transitory affairs. It is not, however, confined to knowledge of particulars (the bearing of general principles upon special cases) ; it has principles proper to itself. At the same time its general importance is rated decidedly below that of theoretical reason. The position is the same in the Scholastic system of thought and speech : when Thomas Aquinas talks of cognitio practica he means neither more nor less than knowledge bearing upon action. In recent times Ch. Wolff, more than any one else, helped to establish a division of philosophy into theoretical and practical, and gave the former unqualified first place.* Kant followed him, both in his language and in his division of philosophy, but with the very important difference that he reversed the position ; practical philosophy — as that which " freedom makes possible " — now takes the lead, and is made to create an independent sphere of thought : "Practical reason, in Kant's philosophy, annexes territory which had previously belonged to theoretical reason, since it originates postulates, that is, theoretical first principles, which the critique of pure reason held to be doubtful " (Trendelenburg, Logische Unter- suchungen, 3rd edit., ii. 457). Since reason was held by Kant to attain complete independence only in this sphere, it followed that here we drew nearest to truth itself — in fact, nowhere else could humanity find an absolute truth.! From Kant's position it is only a step to Fichte's : " Practical reason
* Thus for example in the Logica, § 92 : Palaiu igititr est, philosophiam practicam universam ex Metaphysica principia petere debere. § 93 : Meta- physica philosophiam practicam prcecedere debet.
f The manner in which Kant deduced convictions from practical reason is not without its doubtful side, and it met with a good deal of opposition. Thus Harms, for example, says {Gesch. der PhilosopJiie seit Kant, p. 247): "Kant calls ideas postulates of practical reason. They are, however, not postulates of practical reason at all ; they are postulates of theoretical reason in the knowledge of practical reason, of reason applied to conduct in the moral life of the spirit. In Kant's philosophy the term practical reason is itself ambiguous, for on the one hand it means reason applied to conduct, on the other, the knowledge of practical reason."
5
66 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
is the root of all reason," Thus one period reduces the practical to a mere application of the theoretical, while another exalts it to the position of a source of new truths.
A fundamental opposition runs through the history of these terms : namely, that hetween cosmic knowledge and moral conduct (which is the most usual meaning of practical reason). The question is, which should govern our lives and control our convictions ? The answer decides our position with regard to reality and at the same time the form which reality takes. We have here two types of life in direct opposition to one another, the one tending more especially towards hreadth and clarity, the other towards warmth and strength ; order dis- tinguishes the one, freedom the other.
The Greek thinkers, without exception, assign the first place to intellect. They difi"er only as to the greater or less extreme to which they carry out their fundamental idea. This high valuation of the intellect was the natural expression of the Greek conviction that man belonged to an unchangeable cosmic scheme, forming, as it were, a magnificent framework of undis- puted reality to our human existence. There remained nothing to do except to create a philosophy of this cosmos, free from the littlenesses of everyday-life and all the confusion of human circumstance. We may mention Aristotle, who gave purest expression to Greek culture, as upholding the absolute superiority of the life of speculative enquiry over practical life (which latter only occupied people with transitory things and made them dependent upon their environment) : true happi- ness can only follow in the track of philosophical research. Fui'ther, the trend towards morality, which took place under the Stoics, did not mean so much a separation of life from thought as an absorption of practical energy by thought, a raising of thought to the status of reasoned action. The last flash of the Greek spirit, the philosophy of Plotinus, reveals an elevation of thought to complete sovereignty and world- creative power. In its very decline the ancient Greek world emphasised more than ever its belief in that intellectual power which gave to its cultural work an immeasurable breadth and a marvellous clearness.
THEORETICAL-PRACTICAL 67
It lay in the very nature of Christianity to reject this valuation. When the chief problem of life is the relationship of man to God ; when, along with the appearance of new depths, men become conscious of difficult complications and even dark abysses in the human soul, and when, in consequence, the chief task becomes that of spiritual ascent and renewal, then the attention of humanity will not be directed towards cosmic knowledge but towards the condition of the soul, and beyond that to the building up of a new scheme of human relationships. This means the complete rooting up of intellectualism.
But this inner transformation did not express itself to any great extent as a shaping force determining the general con- ditions of life. Moreover, that which tilled men's hearts did not supply the strength to create a corresponding thought-world. Augustine alone made serious progress in this direction. Con- sider, for example, his reference of all reality to the will {nihil aliud quam voluntates) and the leading position which he gives to the will in his psychology (as the uniting force in the soul), liut even Augustine did not develop the Christian view of life into a complete system with a corresponding thought- world.
It has thus come to pass that the development of Christianity has been powerfully and enduringly influenced by a system of thought which it had intended to replace. Christianity sufi'ers to this day from a division between inner feeling and outward form. Christian dogma stands under the influence of Greek intellectualism. Assuming that divine doctrine replaced secular doctrine, we still have to face the fact that right knowledge was regarded as the standard for testing the truth and value of life. At the height of the scholastic period we see Greek intel- lectualism more powerful than ever ; logical reasoning advances into the remotest depths of the Christian thought-world.* There was no lack of opposing tendencies laying stress on the will, such as Duns Scotus' f nominalism (mysticism with a practical
* It was only in an outward sense that mediaeval philosophy was the hand- maid of theology. In an inward sense it would be much nearer the mark to say that philosophy moulded theology.
t He says, for example (see Stockl, P/nL d. Mittelalt., ii. 788): tides non est habitus speculativus, nee credere est actus speculativus, nee visio sequens credere est visio speculativa, sed practica. Nata est enim ista visio conformis fruitioni.
68 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
tendency), and the Reformation enabled this trend of thought to achieve a great victory. Luther tried with all his might to liberate Christianity from the power of Greek intellectualism, whether Aristotelian or Neo-Platonic ; he believed that Greek thought had volatilised or obscured the real substance of Christianity. Melancthon calls the "heart and its emotions" "the most essential and chief part of man."
But notwithstanding the development of will, Protestantism did not find the power to convert its innermost sources of strength into a system of life ; it, too, ended in again paying homage to the power of intellectualism. If speculation was permanently dispensed with, knowledge of another kind — a knowledge of historical data — but all the same knowledge, appeared to be indispensable to the rescue of souls. The conception of belief, too, took a strongly intellectualistic turn ; the new church became first and foremost a congregation based upon doctrine, a school of the pure word. A new orthodoxy came into existence, at least equal to that of the Greeks in self- righteousness and intolerance.
The Modern World from the very outset unreservedly and joyously took up the task of thought. It looked to thought in hope of breaking away from the yoke of historical tradition. Thought promised to bring clarity into a chaos that had become intolerable. Men believed that thought could break through the tissue of trivial human interests and open up the prospect of an infinite cosmos. As compared with the Greek method, thought has now passed from quiet contemplation to something more akin to restless work, belligerent advance ; from assimilating a given world it has come to building up a new one ; thought of this kind dominates the Enlightenment down to its every detail — not only the speculative school with its bold cosmic philosophy, but also the empirical with its tendency towards practical life. Here, also, salvation is expected entirely from definite and clearly defined knowledge. The type of knowledge is no longer what it was — nevertheless it is still knowledge.* Like all great movements, the Enlightenment carried within itself its own
* See for example "Locke (at the commencement of the Essay) : " Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct."
THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL 69
antidote. The enhanced and excessive emphasis laid upon knowledge necessarily gave rise to doubts as to the extent to which knowledge of the world is possible and as to the power of knowledge over mankind.* But a mere reaction has never yet been able to dominate men's minds, and a positive turn had to be given to this tendency before it was capable of directing humanity into a fresh path.
Such a change was effected in the philosophical sphere by Kant. His influence in this matter, both in a positive and negative sense, was incomparably the greatest which had yet attached to any scientific work. Never before had the capacity for more knowledge been so keenly and thoroughly tested, and the conditions of its successful attainment so accurately ascer- tained. The result was a violent upheaval, the destructive effect of which was more than compensated for by the raising of moral action to the status of a moral world and the recognition of this world as the core of all reality. This upheaval brought intellectualism, for the first time, face to face with an opposing movement of equal force ; a movement which had been in existence for thousands of years, but had not previously been scientifically classified and systematised. Intellectualism, never- theless, raised its head again in the shape of Hegel's Panlogism — raised it as boldly as ever ; but this was only rendered possible by lightly passing over the true significance of Kant's work, and soon there came the reaction with gathered force. Since then the prevailing tendency of the age has been against intel- lectualism. This may be noticed in the influence of Schopen- hauer, with his doctrine of the will ; also in the religious and theological tendency which aims at laying chief emphasis upon the claims and tasks of practical life. We see it in the pre- ference of humanity in general for attacking practical social
* This is to be seen, for example, in the case of Pascal, and even better in that of Bayle, the most important sceptic of the Enlightenment. The latter says, for example (aniv. div. 1727, iii. 8dh) : Ce ne sont pas les opinions genirales de Vesprit qui nous diterminent d agir, mais les passions p)r6sentes du cceur. Bayle's faithful disciple, Frederick the Great, agreed with him in believing that life derived its strength and fixity solely from morality : Les sciences doivent etre consideries comme des moyens qui nous donnent plus de capacity pour remplir nos devoirs (see Zeller, Friedrich d. G. als Philosoph, p. 183).
70 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
questions rather than pondering over cosmic problems — the former, indeed, force themselves upon our attention with increasing persistency. Within the special sphere of science, psychology in particular tends to strengthen the new tendency, because it reveals the extent to which the world of ideas is dominated by the power of instincts and interests, and would even like to demonstrate that the will directs the movements of this world.
This high valuation of the will is accompanied by a desire to attribute every possible evil in modern life to the predominance of reason. We are uncertain as to the main direction which our effort should take and our spiritual life rests upon no sure foundation : it is stated that the intellect is responsible for this state of affairs ; in its desire to have proof for everything, it will allow us to possess only what comes to us indirectly, and the certainty of direct life is thus rendered impossible. We live in a chaos of different opinions and different values, and this, we are told, is due to the dominion of the reasoning activity, which causes individuals to rely solely on their own powers of reflection and hence inevitably drives them farther apart from one another. It is complained that things holy and divine no longer command reverence, and the explanation is sought in the undue develop- ment of human self-consciousness, itself chiefly brought about by the intellect, with its sense of power and its overweening pride of knowledge. If the intellect is thus mainly responsible for all our errors, release from its tyranny should result in a general increment of health throughout the whole of life. Has modern voluntarism the power to procure such a release ?
(b) Voluntarism
Voluntarism is not a simple phenomenon ; each important historical epoch has had its own special voluntarism, which has taken a form determined by the leading tendency of the age.
In the sphere of religious thought, this tendency was repre- sented by the view that not only God's revelation but man's acceptance of it was a self-originated act of will. This view emphasised the independence, spontaneity, and pure actuality of religious life. It rejected all attempts to make religion intelli-
THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL 71
gible by reference to its broader context. The opposition between intellectualism and voluntarism is clearly shown in the well-known comparison of Thomas Aquinas with Duns Scotus ; the former said that God ordained good because it was good, the latter that good was good because God ordained it. Voluntarism did full justice to the specific qualities of religion, its indepen- dence and its uniqueness. At the same time a danger arose — namely, that of a separation of religion from the rest of life, an absence of all points of connection. Since a complete spiritual penetration and assimilation of the content of truth was not achieved, it was easy for the immediacy of religious experience to turn to shallow and obstinate certainty of conviction, the spontaneity and freedom to blind self-will. One cannot help thinking of Plotinus' saying, that he who strives to rise above reason is in no little danger of becoming unreasonable.
In the sphere of philosophy, voluntarism takes on a different complexion. It is now a question of shifting the centre of gravity of life from knowing to willing (more especially to willing in its connection with the moral life). A lack of con- fidence in our capacity for obtaining knowledge supplied the chief impetus in this direction ; since our knowledge did not appear capable of penetrating to real fundamentals, it did not seem in a position to furnish a sure foundation for life. Unless truth, in the fullest sense of the word, was to be completely abandoned, another source of truth had to be found, and after the disturbance of religious faith there seemed to be no other save man's moral conduct. Kant interpreted the moral life in such a deep sense that it became the revelation of a new world ; a world forming the last depth of reality. This world, however, could not be theoretically made plain to everyone, any more than could moral conduct itself. It could not be exhibited as a present possession, and was capable of carrying conviction only to those who recognised the fundamentally moral nature of life and took up their human responsibilities. Deeds thus precede knowledge, and what results from them in the shajDe of decisive conviction is not of the nature of theoretical knowledge, but is a practical postulate. We all know that the consequences of this teaching were deep, revolutionary, and intensely stimulating.
72 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
It is difficult to pass judgment upon this phase of the problem, because fruitful and necessary truths are here so closely com- bined with questionable interpretations. A clearly expressed and outstanding truth is the dependence of our ultimate con- victions upon the operations of the inward life and the reality manifested in and through these, and not upon conditioning factors situated in the external world. This view puts an end to all attempts at penetrating to an inner nature of things by means of speculation and then interpreting reality from this new standpoint. Closely connected with this truth is another ; that the content of inner life is not ready-made property, acquired without eflfort, but must germinate within us and gradually un- fold itself. The way in which a given person sees the world will depend upon the degree of this inner development. We thus see why it is that humanity in its struggle after truth becomes inwardly divided against itself, and why it is that the personal factor is so important.
As soon as we pass from considering this position in a general way to examining its results when systematically worked out, we find ourselves in a region filled with doubt. It is one thing to attach a central importance to the fundamental facts of the inward life, and to rely upon them as determining data in our quest for knowledge : it is another to exalt them to the position of a direct source of knowledge. The one is as necessary as the other is impossible. The facts of the inward life, just as they are, cannot be immediately made use of as a secure foundation. They must first of all be clarified and illuminated by the methods of philosophy. What is subsequently found to be fundamental and established as true has universal validity and its accompanying inner compulsory force ; it is impossible for it to be dependent upon a personal assent.
Some mathematical truths are so difficult to understand that only very few people are capable of fathoming them. Does this interfere in the slightest degree with their universal validity ? Following the same line of argument, if the truths of life do not carry complete conviction until a corresponding life has been developed, and if a decision of the whole man is necessary in order to approach them, this does not mean that they are in any
THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL 73
sense reduced to mere possibilities, which one may accept or not as one pleases. They continue fully to retain their character as necessary truths possessing universal validity. The subjectivity does not lie in truth itself, but in the relationship of humanity to it. Nothing can be completely true that is inwardly connected with any subjective factor. Looking at the matter from this point of view, we are compelled, on principle, to reject the con- ception of practical reason as one-sided and misleading. There are not two reasons, one theoretical and the other practical, existing side by side. There is one reason and one alone, con- cerned with the whole of life. The conception of self-activity is, however, to be included in that of reason, as one of its essential attributes. Reason must not be conceived of as a thing utterly detached ; it is the representative of a completely independent life — of reality self-poised and self- contained. In the absence of such a life there could be no truth at all.
Moreover, Kant's conception of practical reason is a much more exalted one than that usually in vogue. It is a concep- tion which revolutionises the whole of life, brings about a shifting of the centre of gravity towards original creative work, and (in a particular direction) gives life a cosmic character possessing strict universal validity. If this is anything it is metaphysics, although not of the kind we deal with in onto- logical speculation. But in proportion as this metaphysical character becomes obliterated, the sphere of practical reason ceases to be the whole reality with all its depth, and becomes one of a number of separate spheres, thus less and less ful- filling the function of universally valid truth. Hence life based upon such practical reason tends to narrow practical and moral life and to isolate it from the rest of human culture, with the result that the former becomes subjective and impressionable, the latter superficial and merely utilitarian in its aims — life as a whole deteriorating through this division. The work of human culture should never become separated from men's ultimate con- victions, for the wider the gap between them, the more impossible is it for our life to be spiritually controlled and permeated and for any real greatness to be achieved.
74 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
In the life of to-day, voluntarism presents itself in yet another aspect ; namely, as a scientific theory, which comes to the front, in the first place, in psychology as a movement which aims at demonstrating the dependence of the life of ideas upon the instincts and desires, and the conditioning of its entire course by a voluntary phase — as is seen more particularly in Wundt's theory of apperception. Much new and valuable knowledge has been won along these lines and our general insight into the whole matter has been deepened. It is, however, distinctly questionable whether, in this case, we have not often to do less with an opposition between intellect and will than with one between a central and a peripheral activity of the soul, extend- ing through the whole of life.
The shape which voluntarism (with the accompanying undue preponderance of practical activity) takes in the life of to-day must be considered from the broadest standpoint. Speaking in a general way, it may be said that it reveals itself in the pre- vailing view that the practical satisfaction of man (of man in relation to his immediate environment) is the one and only true goal — the pursuit of knowledge being looked upon as a mere means to this end and indeed a foolish waste of time unless devoted to the promotion of human well-being. That such is the general tendency of modern life has been already pointed out in the historical sketch. Humanity has become weary of strug- gling over cosmic problems. Questions of inner development, of the development of the whole man to a world-embracing personality, are pushed far into the background by the unceasing growth of political, economical, and technical problems. The struggle for economical self-preservation, in particular, more and more absorbs all our powers and increasingly causes life and conduct to be looked upon as mere matters of utility. Such a state of affairs leaves no sort of room for knowledge to retain any self-value. The pragmatic movement in particular (which, starting in America and England, has more and more occupied the attention of the civilised world) attempts to develop a specific theory of knowledge with this practical point of view as centre. Let us examine this subject a little more in detail.
THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL 75
(c) Pragmatism
Pragmatism is, as yet, so little known in Germany that before proceeding further it will be well to make a few explanatory remarks. We will take as our main basis a series of lectures by William James, delivered with the object of elucidating pragmatism.* The expression pragmatism was first used as a philosophical concept in its present sense by Charles Pierce in the American magazine The Popular Science Monthly (1878). Twenty years later James took the matter up and developed it in brilliant fashion. Among other exponents may be men- tioned Dewey (Chicago) and Schiller (Oxford), the latter being the originator of the expression "humanism." It is inter- esting, from a social and historical point of view, to notice that now for the first time we see America taking the lead in a philosophical movement ; it is in America, too, for the most part, that pragmatism has become a widespread tendency. In Europe this movement has been more influential in England and in Italy than elsewhere.
Speaking of the relationship between pragmatism and other tendencies of thought, James says (p. 51): " Pragmatism repre- sents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents it, as it seems to me, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed"; and further (p. 53): "It agrees with nominalism, for instance, in always appealing to particulars ; with utili- tarianism in emphasising practical aspects ; with positivism in its disdain for verbal solutions, useless questions, and meta- physical abstractions." Pragmatism claims credit for being a method, and not a system. This method consists in bringing the pursuit of knowledge into close relationship with human existence and its development. Nothing is to be reckoned true that cannot be justified from this point of view. The true thus becomes a portion of the good (p. 76) : " The true is the name
* Pragmatism (translated into German by Wilhelm Jerusalem (1908).) Jeru- salem's article called Der Pragmatismus : eine neue philosophische Methode {Deutsche Literaturzeitung, January 25, 1908) is also worthy of notice. — • Tr. note : The references given in this chapter are to the English original of Pragmatism (1907).
76 MAIN CURRENTS OF MODERN THOUGHT
of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite assignable reasons." Again (p. 194) : " All our theories are instrumental, are mental modes of ac/o/j- tation to reality, rather than revelations or gnostic answers to some divinely-instituted world-enigma." In pursuance of this line of thought "humanism" looks upon truths as products of the human race : " Truth makes no other kind of claim and imposes no other kind of ought than health and wealth do. All these claims are conditional " (p. 230).
Such a conception as this must give a thoroughly peculiar turn to scientific enquiry in so far as the latter is now directed not so much towards establishing principles as towards following up the consequences involved in their development. We no longer consider things as they are in themselves, apart from mankind, but refer everything to humanity and estimate it according to its value for humanity.
What does this signify, and what kind of a transformation does it bring about? These questions are best answered by a consideration of the examples brought forward by James himself.
The conflict between materialism and spiritualism appears in quite a new light, and is brought to a decision by estimating the services rendered by each to the cause of humanity, and not by dwelling upon the correctness or otherwise of the principles involved in the two tendencies. By materialism is understood (in this connection) that species of thought which explains the higher phenomena by means of the lower and represents the destinies of the world as being controlled by its blind compo- nents and unconscious forces : by spiritualism, that which assigns the controlling power to the higher elements, thereby making spirit something more than a mere witness and reporter of the course of events and recognising it as capable of active participation in the same. Let the question now be asked, Which of these two conceptions best promotes human life? There can be no doubt as to the answer. The final practical conclusions of materialism are completely cheerless, while spiritualism, with its affirmation of a moral order throughout the universe, gives full liberty to our hopes (p. 108) : " Spiritual-
THEORETICAL— PRACTICAL 77
istic faith in all its forms deals with a world of promise, while materialism's sun sets in a sea of disappointment." The reli- gious problem is discussed along the same lines : instead of dealing with speculative principles, the matter is approached from the point of view of human needs (p, 299) : " On prag- matistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now, whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is to build it out and deter- mine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the other working truths."
He who has made himself at home within the movement will readily understand that it is quite capable of gaining wide influence in contemporary circles. By assigning first place to what had formerly been regarded as only of occasional and secondary importance, things are seen in a manner which seems to make them peculiarly simple and easy of comprehension. It is obvious that a great simplification must ensue, because all problems not related to the maintenance of human life are dropped as unprofitable ; at the same time this relationship seems to provide an entirely impartial standard of valuation for the various assertions, thus enabling the matter, in each case, to be raised above mere party strife. Truth becomes more direct and fruitful, more plastic and adaptable, by being thus thrown into the centre of the stream of life and called upon to take an active share in the forward movement. Such a solution seems to be particularly suitable for a time like our own, so divided in its convictions.* The positive side of the work, more- over, receives essential support from an incisive criticism of the traditional concept of truth.
Notwithstanding the stimulating power of such a movement, supported as it is by brilliant and distinguished thinkers, we are compelled to regard it, when we consider it as a whole and in its ultimate bearings, as an error. The powerful impression
* James remarks in this connection (p. 194) : " Certainly the restlessness of the actual theoretic situation, the value for some purposes of each thought- level, and the inability of either to expel the others decisively, suggest this pragmatistic view."
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produced by pragmatism is due, in the first place, to the fact that it reverses the conventional way of looking at things. But what if, in the process, the idea of truth itself is reversed and ends by standing on its head? And this is what actually happens. The essence of the conception of truth, and the life and soul of our search after truth, is to be found in the idea that in truth man attains to something superior to all his own opinions and inclinations, something that possesses a validity completely independent of any human consent ; the hope of an essentially new life is thus held out to man, a vision of a wider and richer being, an inner communion with reality, a liberation from all that is merely human. On the other hand, when the good of the indi- vidual and of humanity becomes the highest aim and the guiding principle, truth sinks to the level of a merely utilitarian opinion. This is destructive of inner life. All the power of conviction that truth can possess must disappear the moment it is seen to be a mere means. Truth can only exist as an end in itself. "Instrumental" truth is no truth at all.
We must not be understood to assert that the influence of different doctrines upon human conditions is an unimportant theme. It is certain that much stimulus and illumination may be derived from a more careful study of this influence and an examination of its causes. But what we are here concerned with is, in the first instance, something merely phenomenal ; what is essential, or non-essential, right or wrong, has still to be made clear.
Pragmatism disintegrates truth by reducing it to a crowd of separate truths, and even claims credit for doing so. But can we be sure that these separate truths will dwell peacefully and harmoniously side by side, that there will be no conflict between them ? In the case of conflict how is arbitration to take place ?
Finally, the chief aim and end of pragmatism — the success and enrichment of human life — is, as an end, by no means free from objection. By human life is here meant civilised life on the broad scale ; but in order to regard this life as so surely good, one must be inspired by the optimistic enthusiasm for human culture which was more characteristic of earlier ages than it is of our own. Is this life, when taken as in itself the
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final thing, really worth all the trouble and excitement, all the work and effort, all the sufferings and sacrifices that it costs ? When we examine this life, with its vanity and show and its inner emptiness, when we consider how it is penetrated through and through by impurity and pretence, does it not seem a fearful contradiction? Shall the quest after truth be made a means for the preservation of this exceedingly dubious life ? We can- not conceive of any belief more hazardous than a faith in life so baseless as this.
{d) Our own Position : Activism
In the introduction to the German edition of William James's Pragmatism, Jerusalem refers to the approximation of my own position towards that of the pragmatists, and remarks: " Eucken's activism rests upon definite metaphysical assumptions, while pragmatism is purely empirical " (p. vii). It is true that I sympathetically welcome an effort which aims at bringing truth into closer relationship with life and regarding it as more than a merely intellectual matter ; at the same time I am fully in agreement with the rejection of that conception of truth which makes it consist in con- formity with an entity existing side by side with ourselves. The question remains, What is meant by life? Here we must recognise a wide gap between the tendencies indicated by the above two concepts, "empirical" and "metaphysical." In the former case life stands for the actual condition of man, for the human state (whether it be the individual or the race that is referred to, does not make any ultimate difference). On the other hand, when we speak of seeking a closer connection between truth and life, we mean the life of the spirit as a self-sufficient life {Beisichselhstsein des Lebens), which forms, with its own contents and values, something essentially new over against all merely human conditions, and requires, more- over, a complete reversal of the immediate state of affairs. Pragmatism and activism attach very different meanings to the union of truth with life. The former regards truth as merely the means towards a higher end (which seems to us
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subversive of inner life), while the latter makes it an essential and integral portion of life itself, and hence can never consent to it becoming a mere means.
If we measure the achievements of various tendencies of thought in the struggle for truth by the fruitfulness of their contributions to the development of life, we arrive at essentially different results, according as we take up the one standpoint or the other. In the one case the standard is usefulness to humanity, with all the relativity which this implies ; in the other, it is the preservation and content of spii'itual life, and the various tendencies of thought must here be valued by the measure of their success in substantially deepening and broaden- ing this life. The difference between these two positions may become so marked as to amount to complete opposition. A tendency of thought may call upon men to make sacrifices which their human nature will find hard ; it may make their lives difficult rather than easy — indeed, all truly great thought has this effect — but at the same time it can enlarge and enrich intellectual and spiritual life. On the other hand, what tends to promote comfortable human existence may be extremely oppressive to the life of the spirit. Modern life clearly shows us that an age full of pleasure and rich in achievement may be empty enough spiritually. [For a further discussion of the concept of truth the reader is referred to my Grundlinien einer neuen Lehensanscliauung (1907) ; {Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, trans. A. Widgery, pub. A. & C. Black).]
In company with the pragmatists we wish for a conversion of life into activity, but we think this cannot be realised so long as we start from life as we find it with all its rigid limitations ; it can only take place through a reversal of this existence, through going back to a new starting-point and developing a new life. That this is a species of metaphysics we do not deny ; in fact we emphatically demand metaphysics, since it is only by a reversal of the immediate condition of things that an original and self-active life is made possible, and hence spiritual life cannot maintain itself without some sort of metaphysics. In this way we again come back to the necessity of an independent spiritual life as a new stage of
L/
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reality, as the unfolding of the depths which reality contains within its own nature.
Taking into account all the ahove considerations, it does not appear as if the contrast between intellectualism and voluntarism really went to the root of the matter. It is not sufficient to transfer the chief emphasis in life from one activity of the soul to another. This brings about no really essential change in life, no enhancement of life ; it does not raise us above the old fixed limits. The real contrast is that between a free, self-active life on the one hand, and, on the other, one which, however eager or diligent, is inwardly enslaved. But once this is recognised, the whole matter takes on an essentially new complexion.
(e) Intellect and Intellectualism
The distinctive character of the activistic position is perhaps most easily explained by a consideration of its attitude towards intellectualism and intellectual work. It is under no induce- ment whatever to diminish in any way the importance of intellectual work. It cannot look upon the latter as an accessory to the central things of life, as something that could be quite well dispensed with. The desired reconstruction of life, the direction of life towards self-activity, will never by any chance be accomplished and maintained without energetic intellectual work. In this connection we may refer to history, which witnesses that whenever the quest of knowledge has been held in high honour it has always figured as an essential portion of life, a portion which, if undeveloped, would prevent life itself reaching its full stature ; it has never appeared in the character of a mere accompaniment of life or of an explanation following upon a "given" and finished state of affairs. We see this exemplified in Plato, in the Fathers of the Church (such as Clement and Origen), and in Spinoza and Leibniz. It was universally believed that knowledge first made it possible for the spiritual content of life to reach its fullest development and to become the complete property of humanity. Even if the claims of knowledge to be the whole
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of life were pressed to the point of error, it was at any rate recognised that knowledge was no mere copy of reality : it did not exist side by side with life, but within life. However decisively, in consequence, we must reject the idea of making the intellect a scapegoat for everything we dislike in modern life, he who desires an independent and self-sufficing spiritual life and believes that if human life is to possess a true content it must be derived from this source, is thereby saved from any tendency to impart an intellectualistic form to life ; he is much more likely to be extremely sensitive to the way in which the Modern World in particular (including our own age) has been swamped by intellectualistic movements. His regard for spiritual life as a whole will prevent him, however, from agreeing with the verdict passed by the voluntarists upon this inundation. But let us first examine this development of the power of intellectualism. We shall then be able to judge whether or no the attempted counter-movement is really strong enough to cope with it.
1. The Invasion of Modern Life by Intellectualism
In the first place we are influenced by the various forms of intellectualism which have come down to us from the past. There is the intellectualism of the classical epoch, when spirit and intellect were usually regarded as interchangeable terms. Another form manifested itself in the life of the Christian Church, which in spite of opposing tendencies, persisted for the most part in giving its belief the character of an intellectual activity. The Modern World, too, looked more especially to intellectual activity to bring about that up-levelling of life towards which it worked. This tendency has been maintained right down to the present day, and is shown not only in tendencies originating in the inner life, such as speculation, enlightenment, and so forth, but even more clearly in that type of thought which is shaped by the study of nature. For natural scientists are still accustomed to identify spirit and consciousness and to interpret spiritual life as a mere reflection of an external world. Hence, from their point of view, all moral
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elevation, and indeed our whole salvation, is to be expected, in the first place, from a rectification of concepts.*
Nothing could bear clearer witness to the power of in- tellectualism than the fact that the counter-movements have often become intellectualistic themselves and ended by con- tributing to its influence. A new content was desired ; but it was presented in the old form, and therefore fell at once into the power of the enemy. So it was throughout the whole history of Christianity ; and so it has continued to be right into the nineteenth century. Schelling, towards the latter end of his career, struggled with all his might to tear up the deeply rooted rationalism of his time and replace it by a positive and irrational mode of thought. But his new thought was expressed as a mere doctrine. To accept this doctrine and to be converted to these principles was to place one's life upon a basis of truth. If this is not rationalism and intellectual- ism, what is it? Very likely many present-day opponents of intellectualism are doing exactly what Schelling did !
Intellectualism has firmly rooted itself in habits of thought both old and new, and the influence which it thus exerts is even more dangerous than any we have referred to above, because it is more subtle and penetrates more deeply. From the earliest times the essential task of knowledge has been taken to be the abstracting of universals from the limitless multiplicity of appearances : in the ancient world this was in complete accord- ance with the prevailing view of reality as a whole, since simple and unchangeable forms seemed to constitute its fundamental structure ; but now that this latter view is no longer held, the corresponding conception of the task of knowledge is discredited.
* This is seen with especial clearness in the greatest realistic system of the nineteenth century, the philosophy of Comte. We can only mention a few characteristic passages from the Cours de Philosophie Positive {4th ed. 1877) : in i. 40-41, we read : Le micanisme social repose finalement sur des opinions ; according to iv. 113, the unsatisfying position of present-day affairs is mainly due to intellectual anarchy, so that our first necessity is a philosophie convenahle ; the deepest root of political corruption is declared to be Vimpuissance et le discredit des idies ginirales. Comte in fact regarded the epochs of history as corresponding to stages of knowledge. Modern monism, too, beUeves itself capable of raising the whole level of life by means of a rectification of concepts (see chapter on " Monism and Dualism ").
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In order to pick out the main characteristics of experience and unite manifoldness into a whole, far more is involved and far more is demanded than any mere abstracting of points of resemblance.*
Along with this intellectualistic over- valuation of the search for universals there goes a remarkable cult of the abstract concept— a cult which became particularly prominent during the nineteenth century. What a power is exercised to-day by such excessively vague concepts as reason, civilisation, law, value, progress, humanitarianism ! Their chief recommendation seems to lie in their indefinite character, which relieves us from making disagreeable decisions. Frequently they serve as blank cheques for each individual to fill in at pleasure. At the same time we criticise Hegel, whose concepts at any rate imparted a definite content to a connected thought-world.
The influence of intellectualistic thought is to be seen also in the popular inclination to conceive of our conduct after the fashion of a logical conclusion, as the subsumption of a par- ticular case under a general law. As a matter of fact, scientific work itself would not be able to go very far, and in particular it would not achieve anything new, if the logical forms were not mere vessels, filled and made vital by the thought-process. Out- side the scientific world the perversion becomes even more obvious ; when, for example, political life and legal proceedings,
* The term abstraction itself manifests this alteration ; in accordance with it the term has passed through two chief phases, a logical-metaphysical and a psychological, the former going back to Aristotle, the latter to Locke. Abstract (s^ a.(paiptani)c, XeyofiEva) is the name given by Aristotle to forms existing apart from matter — more particularly the mathematical quantities. This meaning was retained during the Middle Ages (abstrahere formam a materia intellectu). It was not until the Modern World that abstraction was looked upon as involv- ing a gradual selection of common properties from the multiplicity of appear- ances. The older meaning survived the sway of the ancient doctrine of forms ; thus, for example, in Baumeister's dejinitiones philosophicce ex systemate Wolfii collected (def. DCCXXXV) it runs : abstrahere ea diciviur, si ea, quce in percep- tione distingmmtur, tanquam a re percepta sejuncta intuemur. In Kant's Logik (viii. 92, Hartenst.) abstraction means "the separation of all the distinctive elements from the given ideas, so as to leave only what is common." Hence he will not say "to abstract something " (abstrahere aliquid), but " to abstract from something," and gives it as his opinion that "one should really call abstract concepts, abstracting concepts (conceptus abstrahentes)." The uncertainty in modern terminology is largely due to the confusion of these two meanings.
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and indeed all human actions, are interpreted as the application of general principles to particular cases. To do this is to force everything into a rigid pattern and destroy originality and in- dividuality. It is also one of the roots of the much attacked bureaucracy of to-day (which seems to grow unceasingly, how- ever, in spite of all attacks).
Finally, we must not forget that intellectualism, with its ten- dency to identify thought and spirit and to treat the world mainly as a subject of contemplation, has sunk very deeply into our speech (more particularly in the sphere of science). Although it might appear that the mere terms did not commit us very far, as a matter of fact they may very easily lead us under the yoke of intellectualism.
Intellectualism thus surrounds us on every side ; it holds us captive within the close meshes of its encircling net. No sub- iective feeling can free us from it ; even the assertion of a directly opposite view may very easily lead us, as we have seen, more or less directly back into the old path. There is only one way of giving the matter a new turn. It is by recognising that intellectual work itself does not become positive and productive until it becomes an integral portion of an inclusive spiritual life, both receiving from that life and contributing to its advance- ment, until it is guided by the resultant drift of great spiritual organisations and impelled by the energies which originate from these sources. That this really is so can be proved both directly and indirectly : all genuine intellectual accomplishment has stood in close relationship with movements of spiritual life as a whole ; on the other hand, whenever the work has allowed such rela- tionships to lapse it has rapidly sunk to empty formalism or uncertain reflection. Such a maintenance of the dependence of the intellect upon the whole is perfectly compatible with the recognition of its importance and significance within the whole.
2. The Life-Process as the Foundation of Knowledge
Those who assign but small importance to knowledge, and see in it nothing more than a mere registration of appearances, will not be inclined to waste time in the investigation of its exact nature and its relationship to spiritual life as a whole. But
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those who seek in knowledge an illumination and an inner assimilation of reality will realise that this is a very difficult problem. How is it possible for us to master and appropriate an unfamiliar reality if we do not possess a capacity suitable to such a task, a force with which to meet the resistance of things ? How can an experience become of value to us if it does not link itself to a movement coming from within and carry it forward, and how can it provide us with an answer if no question has first of all been put to it ? But where can the power necessary to carry out this achievement be found if the whole life-process does not complete an inner concentration, combine its several activities together into a whole, and draw upon this whole for assistance in its struggle against the environment? Such a movement as this would impart a specific character and direc- tion to knowledge as to every other manifestation. When life is thus linked together to form a characteristic whole, a sphere of existence peculiar to this whole is marked off from the rest of life, a specific form being imparted to experience and to the fundamental relationship between man and reality and man and his sphere of work. The aims and methods of knowledge will follow these lines. It would be impossible for any one to understand the special and distinctive greatness of Greek philosophy without perceiving it to be a scientific application of the same synthesis of life which lay behind the whole of Greek culture. This synthesis was not obtained independently of intellectual work — on the contrary, it stood in incessant need of its assistance ; but it was not a work of knowledge alone, of a knowledge trusting entirely in its own power. As a matter of fact, it is only a knowledge grounded in a synthesis of life, and drawing upon its rich resources, which can possess settled tendencies and develop along inevitable lines ; only such a knowledge is capable of grasping its object and penetrating to its centre ; only such a knowledge can make reality into a living whole. Why does scholasticism, in spite of all the diligence and ingenuity that went to its construction, make such an impression of poverty ? Why has it been comparatively unfruit- ful, in a spiritual sense, in spite of its extensive opportunities ? It is because it has lacked the shaping force of a characteristic
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life, and has hence been unable to impart to its concepts an inner warmth and a power of imperative conviction. The newer philosophy was predestined to secure the victory over scholasti- cism, if only because a new life worked in it and through it. The same reason explains the distinction between creative thinkers like Leibniz and Kant and capable schoolmen like Wolff and Herbart ; the former bring to light new syntheses of life, and their work produces an enrichment of reality. They do not merely take to pieces and rearrange given material ; they do not merely speculate about reality. They are producers of new reality, parents in the spiritual world. There is no stronger corroboration of this connection between knowledge and spiritual life as a whole than the experiences within the sphere of logic itself, which, on account of the unchangeability and universal validity of its laws, is apt to look upon itself as superior to any dependence or relationship. The inviolability of these laws is clear and indisputable. But laws and forms cannot as such engender living thought. Real human thinking is by no means a mere uniform application of these laws of thought ; over and beyond such application it preserves a characteristic quality which penetrates and dominates every detail, and can come only from the whole of a life-process. From this point of view, thought, in its finer structure, differs with the vital synthesis it expresses. Thus Greek science down to the very details of logical method received a character- istic formation from the general artistic tendency of Greek life, the close relationship between thought and contemplation, the desire for direct and rapid synthesis combined with an aversion to anything indefinite, the acceptance of the elements of life as given and unchangeable. Consider, too, how strongly the intellectual cast of the later classical period and of the Middle Ages shows the influence of a new life dominated by religion ; the whole of our visible existence has now become the mere symbol of an invisible order, the concepts have lost their hard and fast character, the statements their rigid exclusiveness. This allegorical rendering feels and sees a higher world beyond the present condition of sense-existence, but without degrading the latter to the position of an indifferent phenomenon. Thus
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one and the same object is image and substance — sensual and spiritual in one. This almost visionary tendency of thought, dominated as it is by moods and intuitions, is not conscious of the untenable contradictions into which it lapses, at once bind- ing and loosing, affirming and denying. The mediaeval concep- tion of the Church, the doctrine of the sacraments, &c., rest however on this type of thought. Scholasticism at its height became clearer and more restrained, but since, in spite of its energetic development of syllogistic method, it lacked an inde- pendent synthesis and a corresponding vigour of thought-energy, it also lacked the decisiveness of disjunctive procedure, the power to keep incompatible alternatives apart : totally different worlds (such as the Aristotelian, with its welcome, and the ancient Christian, with its repudiation, of the world, or — within Christi- anity itself — the ecclesiastical order and the mysticism which put itself above all order) are here found existing side by side in the most peaceable fashion. The system is so cleverly arranged and graded that so long as a direct collision is avoided the several components seem to be in complete harmony; elements which vigorous thought would at once perceive to be incompatible appear compatible. We may mention, as a further example, that the logical method of modern science, with its keener analysis and more clear-cut divisions, its breaking up even of elements, and its endeavour to penetrate the infinite, shows, clearly enough, a close connection with the modern ideal of power and movement. If, in research of the modern kind, we see the type of all research we are simply identifying a par- ticular species of spiritual life with the spiritual life itself. Just as each clearly defined epoch has its own particular kind of logic, so has every independent thinker ; without a characteristic logic there can be no characteristic mode of thought and no characteristic construction of life. The more powerful this con- struction the deeper will its influence penetrate, until it reaches the simplest elements and activities of thought.
Thus the work of thought will become richer, more individual and more concrete by being associated with life as a whole. At the same time new problems and tasks arise. It must be shown what knowledge accomplishes for life as a whole ; it must be
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more closely demonstrated how, in the development of know- ledge, the separation of the accidental from the essential, the linking up of particulars, the emergence of universal validity, are brought about. At first sight it might seem as if the universal validity of knowledge was particularly threatened through the intimate connection subsisting between knowledge, on the one hand, and the diverse organisations of life on the other. It may be asked, Will not this result in the disintegra- tion of truth (which will become a multiplicity of truths) and in the complete triumph of a destructive relativism ? That would only be the case if all syntheses of life stood side by side, as of equal value, and their several achievements did not work towards a single comprehensive synthesis by reference to which everything was to measure itself. Could not such a synthesis be ever present, as the first object of eftort, and at the same time serve, from the very beginning, for the specific shaping and directing of life and consequently of thought also ? It is no objection to an idea that its formulation should stir up new problems. If the problems are real they will tend to strengthen the fundamental point of view rather than militate in any way against it.
3. The Quest for Truth and its Motive Power
In the struggle for truth, what are really the most powerful and decisive factors ? Every consideration must help to con- vince us that here we find ourselves face to face with genuine problems. An examination of disputes between persons of opposing convictions makes it very clear that mere reasons and proofs are not decisive. How should it be otherwise in that larger arena where mind clashes with mind in the great struggles of human thought? Each disputant translates the arguments of the other into his own language and his own methods of thought, and puts a completely different complexion upon them. The result is two monologues carried on side by side. The controversy seldom reaches the level of real dialogue. In realit}'^ arguments owe their power of conviction not to their logical or dialectical value, but to the content and force of the spiritual life, the spiritual concentrations, the life-energies, which they
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have to draw upon. In the discussion of questions of principle, each disputant is, at the bottom, defending himself and his own inherent character. It is from such spiritual self-preservation that power, warmth, and passion first stream into the intel- lectual movement. Fruitful expression and the possibility of a mutual understanding do not become possible until spiritual kinship has prepared a common ground, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Voltaire were all first-rate logicians, but does anybody suppose that they would have convinced one another had they argued together for an eternity ? Only a shallow and unstable man can ehange his spiritual character in response to mere argument. Standing upon the basis of merely intellectual considerations a man could never possess his own being in joy and security; he would be in perpetual fear of the advent of some more powerful controversialist who would overcome him and force him into a contrary position.
The study of history shows us that it has not been isolated figures of thought, or mere ideas as such, which have dominated men's minds and aroused their passion ; it has been the specific concentrations of life, the spiritual energies. We are often told by conscious and unconscious adherents of Hegelian thought that ideas produce their consequences with overwhelming neces- sity, and that nothing stirs us up so profoundly, nothing drives us forward so irresistibly, as a logical contradiction. Conse- quences and contradictions can certainly acquire an irresistible power over men, but this is not due to purely logical causes. Consequences may lie very near and yet not be fulfilled, contra- dictions may be close at hand and never be felt. It is all a question, in this case, whether the problems do or do not become associated with the task of spiritual self-preservation, and whether or not vital energies unfold themselves through the problems to form a region of spiritual existence. It is only when intellectual life is thus assimilated and enters integrally into the life it expresses that its consequences are imperative and its contradictions unbearable. The power of logic is derived in the first place from the degree of unification, the power of gathering life together into a whole, with which it is associated, rather than (as is often wrongly imagined) from its own resources.
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The patient endurance of a condition of mental contradiction is always an indication of a feeble concentration of life ; it is characteristic of the mental life of children, of primitive his- torical epochs, and of the condition of average humanity, and contrasts with the demands which issue from our spiritual freedom. This weakness is only indicated, not caused, by the defect in the logic.
In the spiritual condition of to-day there is nothing more paralysing and vexatious than the prevailing insensibility to contradictions in thought. It reveals a great lack of cen- tralising energy, of genuine personal life, and of that self- activity which maintains itself amid the busiest employment. Life, as it stands to-day, is full of fundamental contradictions. These are often softened down by superficial compromises, and (if only the harshness of direct conflict can be to some extent avoided) they may appear to be altogether cancelled. Or again, in spite of real contradictions, different types of thought may be unhesitatingly forced together and mixed up with one another. For example, the two fundamentally different points of view represented by the old ethical-religious idealism, on the one hand, and the development of human culture on modern lines, on the other, have frequently had to submit to such treatment. An extraordinary mixture of the most funda- mentally different attitudes towards life is to be seen in the works of the more advanced modern writers. Any one with an ear for harmony of thought must be keenly conscious of the dissonance in the works of Nietzsche, which exhibit a mixture of modern and antique, romantic and classic, artistic and dynamic thought. However, the mass of so-called educated people, who are without really vigorous personal life, do not in the least object to spiritual dissonances ; they look upon them as providing variety and mental entertainment ; the more contradictions, the more "original" and "interesting" is the writer!
Nothing shows the dependence of thought upon the energy of spiritual life more palpably than the developments of religion. Effective religious movements have always come about owing to u.nbearable contradictions making the position at the time being intolerable ; and owing, more especially, to the demand for an
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increased inwardness coming into sharp conflict with the outward institutions, customs, and formulas which the course of time and the attempt to suit human conditions had brought forth. But to what a small extent has the perceiving, enduring, and over- coming of such contradictions been prompted by mere logical considerations ! At the time of the Reformation, for example, the contrast between the outward character of the religion offered by the Church and the desire of earnest souls for some- thing more inward, was obvious to every one ; the greatest scholar of the age, Erasmus, was not less aware of it (as we see from his works) than was Luther. Why, then, did Luther and not Erasmus become the great leader of the Reformation ? Certainly not because he was the greater logician, for in this i*espect he was much inferior to Erasmus. It was because the existing situation, with the contradictions it involved, could not remain, for him, a mere matter of calm contemplation and intel- lectual reflection ; it became a personal affair, causing him acute pain, a state of things which he felt to be simply unendurable. The matter touched him so nearly, that he felt a solution of the conflict to be an imperative necessity, to affect the very centre of his life. His spiritual self-preservation demanded it, with an elemental passion which swept aside every other consideration. The power of the instinct of self-preservation imparted to this simple man the capacity and the right to attack a great traditional order which had become sacred to the hearts of men and to venture upon the construction of a new one. This fundamental spiritual necessity drove Luther forward at all costs, and made him a hero, beside whom Erasmus, with all his superior knowledge, refinement, and intellectual acuteness, seems insignificant.
In spiritual conflicts it is not isolated intellectual consider- ations that carry the day, but basic life-processes and the content of the spiritual reality which they comprehend. Thus the difierent thought-systems are to be referred back to these processes and all real progress depends upon a broadening of this spiritual reality. Antiquated mental syntheses are not over- come through the sudden advent of a superior set of reasons, but by a perception of the limitations of the life which they express.
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Then new concentrations, or at any rate new movements, will appear and a fresh active life will make the old, in spite of its apparent security, seem hollow and obsolete ; even if it continues to preserve its outward appearance the old will lose its spiritual authority ; even where it believes its rule to be safe, it is already defeated. That the decisive point thus shifts itself from the ideas to the energies, from intellectual considerations to creative developments of life, must contribute to the deepening of work and the consolidation of effort. We arrive at an incomparably larger conception of history when we regard it as a conflict of life-power with life-power, rather than of doctrine with doctrine ; the problem becomes altogether more difficult and more funda- mental, since it becomes a question of unearthing the roots of the doctrines, discovering the innermost sources of power, and getting at the decisive crux of the conflict. But we shall be supported and inspired in our work by the conviction that human life is enriched by more primitive forces and more fundamental necessities than any which mere intellectual work has of itself the capacity to produce.
4. Consequences in the Sphere of Knowledge
Such relationship between the work of knowledge on the one hand and spiritual life as a whole with the construction of a spiritual reality, on the other, must have deep-reaching con- sequences for the development of knowledge. Within the necessarily limited scope of this section, we can only deal with these consequences in so far as their result is to facilitate the solution of certain important problems which would otherwise remain beyond the reach of any successful treatment.
There is still much uncertainty as to how philosophy can find an independent task as compared with the separate sciences. The solution so often given, that philosophy has to unify the results of the various separate sciences, is inadequate. For such a unification is either a mere juxtaposition (in which case the word science is being very loosely employed to describe such an encyclopaedia) or else it implies construction and transformation, and this cannot be achieved in the absence of a new principle. Now this new principle can neither be obtained from outside nor
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can it arise from mere intellectual processes ; it must lie in the life-process as a whole. Now, at last, we come to the farthest point accessible to us. The fundamental relationship between man and reality, together with the significance of his life and being, must be determined by the natm-e and experiences of this vital process. From this point of view only can we link the separate sciences together, appraise them rightly, and develop their results. This fundamental process is not found upon the surface of things; it must be extricated and brought to expression, and it is the task of that central philosophical discipline which bears the ancient name of metaphysics to do this ; the other disciplines have then to spread the new light in their several separate departments. Such a conception also explains the close connection between philosophy and human personality, without degi-ading the former to the position of a mere expression of individual character. Moreover, in order to penetrate to this fundamental progi-ess a deep, broad, powerful life is necessary ; to this extent, the measure of life is ultimately the measm-e of thought.
This way of looking at the matter brings us essentially nearer to a solution of the problem of truth. There can, to-day, be no manner of doubt that if truth be conceived of as a correspondence of om* thought with an external world, then we must finally abandon all hope of truth. But the more confident this denial, the more doubtful the affirmation which is to meet and replace it. Now by connecting this problem with the life-process, a new light is thrown upon it. There is no intellectual truth apart from a spiritual truth as a whole, but this means nothing less than the transformation of the world into cosmic life, an appre- hension of reality from within. And the assumption under- lying this is that a spiritual life transcending the himian forms the ultimate basis of reality. Man's own task is a continuous strife and upward endeavour, a pushing-on and climbing-up, an increasing struggle against imspiritual and half-spiritual resis- tances. In this struggle, as we have seen, there is no fruitful knowledge whatever that is not rooted in life-syntheses. But in spite of their actuality, these syntheses are in the first place nothing more than attempts, and it is only in conflict with the
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inner and outer world that they can prove their capacity. In this work of adjustment, knowledge plays a leading part ; it is essential to clarification and examination, indispensable to the establishing of universal validity, to the rejection of all that is human in the petty sense of the word and to the development of the cosmic character of spiritual life. But it cannot exert this critical function without separating itself to a certain extent from that which is merely specific in these syntheses ; on the other hand, the critique cannot lead us any further if it does not assist in the development of a new and a higher synthesis.
In this connection there arises the further problem of a sound starting-point for the development of knowledge. Ever since the direct connection between man and the sensuous world was lost this question has been unavoidable. Knowledge has sought in vain for a firm basis within itself. Again and again dogmatic assumptions have been detected in what was looked upon as primary and unquestionable. There is only one way in which this firm basis can be obtained. The whole of life must be linked up into a unity, and at the same time it must be trans- formed into personal action. In this way alone can axiomatic certainty be attained and shared by knowledge. For man, who is engaged in the struggle, this unity remains a perpetual challenge ; it is only at the end of the journey (an end which lies immeasurably far away) that this unity can be fully realised. But the efi"ort after unity would itself be impossible if the challenge which to man appears so unrealisable were not the fundamental reality of the spiritual life.
It is an old objection to philosophy that through all its long history it has done nothing more than heap opinion upon opinion until it becomes impossible even to become acquainted with them all ; at the same time there is no certainty that the later opinions are more reliable than the earlier ones. Philo- sophy certainly retains an element of freedom and personal decision ; along with religion, morality, art, and all noble things, it always demands the active participation of the individual, and cannot be imposed upon any one from without. But it is not on this account a mere accumulation of human opinions. The knowledge of its close connection with man's endeavour to reach
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spiritual reality securely protects it from this aspersion. Its historical development is thus brought into the closest relation- ship with the evolution of spiritual life in humanity, and as the critical developments of this evolution disclose fundamental facts, they also drive philosophical work along new paths. It is no longer possible for us to regard the great problems of life from the Greek point of view, for Christianity has brought about profound transformations in the life-process ; it has discovered in it such difficult conflicts and such fruitful profundities that a return to the older standpoint would be unthinkable. We have outgrown the Middle Ages also, since the Modern World created a sharper line of separation between the world and man and aroused the inner life to greater independence. Do not these and similar experiences show the thinker in closest re- lationship with history and with humanity as a whole ? This does not, however, involve the loss of his independence. En- vironment can do no more for humanity than provide possibilities and incentives ; to produce therefrom a reality possessing a well- defined character demands forceful progressive action, and this is always a matter of individual initiative. Thus the two factors mutually interact, while the whole, which includes both, grows unmistakably richer and stronger.
5. Consequences with regard to the History of Philosophy
The recognition of such relationship between philosophy and life as a whole must also exert a powerful influence upon our treatment of the history of philosophy. It can no longer be con- sidered adequate to describe and catalogue the various philo- sophical systems just as they are ; it is now our duty to unearth the fundamental life-contents, and thus set the words of the thinker in a more comprehensive context. The main problem is not so much to determine what a philosopher did say as how he came to say it. We must fix the type of spiritual life that he expresses. It thus becomes necessary to elucidate the re- lationship between the thinker and his historical and human environment (though not according to the- current sociologico- historical method, which puts the cart before the horse and
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derives the inner from the outer, the great things from a sum- mation of small ones, the eternal from the temporal). Hence- forth the significance of individual achievements will be measured according to their success in opening up new depths, in broadening spiritual reality. In this sense all great thought is a pressing forward, a reformation, and a creation.
Although this relation of philosophical tendencies to their deeper origins makes the treatment of philosophical history in some respects more complicated, in others it is conducive to simplification. Measured according to the above standards, only quite a few manifestations can really be regarded as creative, and as really adding to the content of life. Only quite a few types stand out from amidst the apparently chaotic mass of material, and these occur, in their essentials, again and again through all the variations of context and expression. The real core can thus be more sharply divided from what is merely accessory. That which is revealed by a first examination is for the most part the mere fringe of things : subtle definitions and explanations, scholarship of one kind and another, more or less intelligent reasoning — material which may provide occupation for the human mind, but which cannot actually enrich spiritual life. We are both richer and poorer than we generally think ; poorer in the extent, richer in the content, of our possessions.
Finally, the process of searching for the ultimate and radical may serve to prevent the over-valuation of the mere systematic form, a practice which easily leads us away from what is more essential. At the same time we do not wish to undervalue systematic form. A systematic correlation binds the several principles closer together and makes contradictions less possible ; it tends towards the organisation and uniform de- velopment of the thought-world. But all this can occur only if a living and inspiring content is presupposed, and this can result only from syntheses and energies of life as a whole : if such a content be lacking, no amount of logical power or of ingenuity in construction and arrangement can prevent the system from degenerating into a meaningless framework. Wolfi"s system jwas much more fully developed than Leibniz's, but was the former the greater philosopher ? Augustine never
7
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worked out his thoughts systematically, owing to the contra- dictory nature of his personality, but he so enriched and enlarged the spiritual world as to influence human thought as few beside him have done. Let us fix our attention in the first place upon essentials, upon creative power, upon the centre of motive force, and not assign undue importance to mere form.
Further discussion would have little value; more detailed explanations would remain no more than fragments from a larger sphere of thought. We have devoted some attention to this subject, because it seemed important to point out that in the very interests of knowledge itself we are driven to seek some- thing more than mere knowledge. At the same time it is obvious that we are not being driven towards voluntarism. It is possible that many of those who call themselves voluntarists aim at something not far from our own goal. We are glad to welcome this agreement. But however the matter may stand with regard to individuals, we must not allow ourselves to lose sight of the essential difference between a mere shifting of the interest within the soul-life itself and an elevation above all empirical soul-life whatsoever.
3. IDEALISM— REALISM
{a) The Terms
The terms idealism and realism have now become so hackneyed that they have almost lost all definite meaning and scientific value. Nevertheless, they still stand for an ancient and per- manent contrast and present a vital issue for modern thought. This being the case, it will be useful for us to commence with a brief discussion of the terms themselves.
The term " idealist " first appears in philosophy towards the end of the seventeenth century.* When Leibniz uses the word in the sense in which he has previously used the term " forma- list," i.e., in opposition to materialist (see 186a, Erdm.), he has in mind philosophers like Plato and Ai'istotle, who saw the essence of a thing in its form. At the same time the modern meaning of the word "idea" began to make itself felt. From meaning a typical form it began (at first in the French language) to mean a mere presentation existing only in the mind. Descartes and Locke, though not without contradictions, helped to introduce this meaning into philosophy, when idealism came to signify a system which allowed reality only to the realm of ideas and hence denied the reality of the external world. The term was applied more especially to Berkeley's doctrine — usually in a depreciatory sense, as implying a dissipation of reality. For example, Wolff called the idealists, the materialists, and the sceptics the " three pernicious sects " (see Wolflf, I'on seinen Schriften, p. 583). Until about the close of the eighteenth
• For further particulars see Vaihinger in the Strassburger Aihandlungen zur Philosophie, p. 94 ff . In the theory of art the use of the term seems to reach further back. At any rate, I have received a friendly intimation to the effect that so far back as Pacheco's Arte de la Pintura (Seville, 1649) idealist was used to describe an artistic tendency; but I am not at present able to cor- roborate this.
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century philosophers were as universally determined to defend themselves against idealism as they were later to call themselves idealists.* As opposed to this conception of idealism, realism was looked upon in the eighteenth century as standing for the existence of a world outside thought, t Herbart and his followers have preserved this use of the terms through the nineteenth century down to the present day.
Idealism and realism, like so many other terms, were essen- tially affected by the Kantian philosophy.! Kant himself at first employed the traditional terminology and hence classifies idealism with scepticism (for example, in the preface to the 2nd ed. of the Critique of Pure Reason). The term tran- scendental (also formal or critical) idealism was coined, not with reference to Plato, but to Berkeley; to the latter's ** empirical," " material," or *' psychological " idealism, Kant opposes a new idealism which does not in any way deny or even doubt the existence of things outside the mind, but explains the forms of perception and thought to be merely sub- jective. Hence all objects which can possibly be experienced by us become mere phenomena, " which have no ground of existence outside our thought." This modification of meaning contains the germ of a fruitful development, in so far as the bearer of the forms, the subject of knowledge, is not so much the individual man in his own particularity as the common structure of our being, the spiritual organisation of humanity. Since the problem thus detached itself from psychology to be taken up by a philosophy of mind, it soon became possible for all those to call themselves idealists (in the widest sense) who maintained the superiority of spiritual activity over the forces of the external world. Thus Schiller writes to W. von Humboldt {Briefwechsel, p. 485) :
• Wolff (see Dc differentia nexus rcrum sapientis et fatalis necessitatis, p. 75) will on no account hear of Plato being called an idealist. Plato certainly called the material world a mere appearance, but by that he did not mean to imply (as do the idealists) that it existed only as an idea.
f In the Middle Ages, as is well known, realism meant the opposite of nominalism ; its adherents were usually called reales. Eealista is first men- tioned by Prantl (Geschichte dcr Logik, iv. 221) as occurring in Petrus Nigri {ca. 1475).
\ For particulars see Trendelenburg, Logische TJntersiiclmngen, 3rd ed., ii. 512 fl.
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"After all, we are both idealists and would be ashamed to have it said of us that things shaped us and not we the things." * No one exerted more influence than Fichte towards establishing this meaning of the term.
The German Revival of Humanism (this newest phase of the Renaissance) employed the term in a manner clearly related to the above, though giving it at the same time a characteristic complexion. Thus the thoughtful article with which F. A. Wolf commenced the Museum der Altertumswissenschaft (1807) explains that " the direction of the spirit towards the ideal " is the "first condition of all higher development"; by this he understands, according to his favourite saying, "it is not suitable for free and magnanimous souls to be always seeking after the useful" (Aristotle, Politics, 1338, b. 2), that the tendency of life should be towards the beautiful, not the useful, towards the harmonious development of all spiritual powers for their own sakes, not for the sake of any result. No one did more than Goethe towards furthering this conception of idealism, which he supported by his personality as well as his life-work, although in other connections he very justly called himself a realist. In the speech of the nineteenth century the philosophical and artistic meanings became merged into one. Idealism came to mean the recognition of self-activity and of the intrinsic value of the spiritual life, and hence, in place of the academic discussion of idealism and realism in connection with the theory of know- ledge which prevailed during the eighteenth century, we have an ancient and permanent human question.
{b) The Conflict of Practical Ideals
The contrast between idealism and realism may be formulated in various ways, but in essentials the problem remains unchanged.
* Schiller examines these terms in a particularly detailed manner in his treatise Ueber naive u. sentimentalischer Dichtung. He regards a realist as one who is governed by the necessity of nature, an idealist as one governed by the necessity of reason. This change of meaning was objected to by the systematic philosophers. Thus Plattner says (Phil. Aphorismen, i. 412) : " The concept idealism is beginning to be used altogether too broadly. It has usually been defined in the past as that system which denies the reality of everything except spirit." ... "As idealism Is now understood, every one la an idealist who looks upon the external world as an appearance; in other words, all philo- sophers, without exception, are idealists."
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Is the real centre of gravity of our life to be sought in the visible or in an invisible world ? Are the chief ends of our existence to be realised in the former or in the latter sphere? Is the life which develops in humanity a continuation of nature, or can it only be comprehended as an essentially new and higher stage of reality? Is all spiritual manifestation a mere accompaniment or tool of a life which is essentially natural ? Has man no other goal than the cultivation and preservation of worldly interests, or does human life acquire a meaning and a value only through participation in an order superior to all merely human conditions ? If we divide reality into higher and lower stages (according to the common view), is the higher derived from the lower or does the higher furnish the key to the understanding of the lower ? The contrast which underlies and pervades all these different formulations divides life so fundamentally, from the largest things down to the smallest, in thought and in action, in value and in content, that its effects make themselves felt throughout every branch of life. This applies to the concept of reality itself. The idealist is bound to protest with all his might against the measurement of this concept in terms of the realistic standard. This is, however, what takes place when the idealistic world is treated as a mere accessory, as a sort of embroidery to a world already given and well-established. The idealist contends that without his thought-world the bare concept of a world and a reality at all would be impossible, and that the sense-world derives its content and value entirely from the thought-world. The fate of idealism is often similar to that of religion. So long as the latter dominated life its world was regarded on all sides as the nearest and most incontestable. Augustine over- came every doubt by appealing to the idea of a Supreme Being. St. Thomas Aquinas called the supernatural world the father- land (patria). The idea of a life beyond and with it that of transcendence did not come to the front in the religious world until after the commanding position of religion had been shaken and its content had lost its real force. When religion is looked upon from the outset as transcendent it is already virtually abandoned. In the same way idealism is already a lost cause when men think of its world as something strange and remote,
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something which cannot be attained to without laborious mental effort.
But if we set the contrast thus sharply before us we entirely abandon the possibility of mediation, even that of the so-called realistic idealism, in so far as it stands for such a compromise. The idealist should and must master the facts which constitute the basis of realism, and it is equally the realist's duty to under- stand idealism. What really happens, however, when they do thus study one another, is that each colours the situation according to his own convictions, thus increasing the contrast rather than bridging it over.
1. Nineteenth-century Realism
During the nineteenth century the old conflict entered upon a new phase, into the meaning of which it is essential to enquire. Up to the period of which we are speaking the course of human culture had run strongly in an idealistic direction. This is true more particularly of traditional religious life, but the new culture, too, had, until then, attacked the problems of life for the most part from within and had tried to make outward circumstances subordinate to the requirements of thought. It is true that an opposing tendency of a realistic nature was never absent, but this was not so much a definite attempt to deal with the problem as a whole as an obstinate resistance on the part of individuals who were too much interested in the joys and sorrows of the sense- world to be able to raise themselves to the level demanded by the idealists. An opposition thus consisting of a number of petty individual forces had correspondingly narrow limits. It may have exerted a depressing and disintegrating influence, but it was quite incapable of setting up a new system of life and thereby shaking idealism to the foundations. Now this was the task undertaken by nineteenth-century realism. This realism maintained that the immediate world is suflicient for man, that it can furnish him with all his aims and satisfy all his desires, and do this without putting life upon a lower level. Such an undertaking was something more than a new arrange- ment or new interpretation of the traditional situation ; it recruited its strength chiefly from the fact that the world of
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immediate human existence had come to mean more to us than it had over done before. It is only because it offers a new reality, opposed to that of tlic idealists, that the now realism can hope to win over humanity. It is more a battle between rival realities than between rival doctrines. This is a corroboration of the contention contained in the foregoing section, that philo- sophical conflict is not so much concerned with the interpreta- tion of an existing situation as with its formation.
A great many different movements combined together in the nineteenth century to produce an enrichment of immediate reality, Man acquired a new and infinitely deeper knowledge of nature's workings, and nature became more and more a subject of human occupation and interest. The ensuing increase in knowledge was quickly converted by technical skill into improve- ments directly affecting human life, which became immensely enriched, accelerated, and strengthened. An amazing growth of human capacity tended more and more to remove the inflexible character of fate. Difficulties themselves, being regarded as challenges, as impulses to new activity, lost their bitterness. At the same time, human society gave rise to more and more difficult tasks. Men became increasingly convinced of the importance of the form in which society is moulded and of the possibility of effecting a real improvement of existing con- ditions, so as to place society upon a higher level and secure a more universal happiness. A ready recognition of the charac- teristic and distinguishing qualities of different nations arose, and tlie development of national character encouraged the growth of corresponding feelings and forces. Within the State, individual forces secured a larger sphere for their expansion and rnaiiifcHtation. In the economical world the tendency towards a more equal distribution of wealth coincided with difficult problems in connection with the technical organisation of labour, thereby stirring up an immeasurable depth of feeling : the power of material conditions was now for the first time clearly per- ceived and fully appreciated ; the inner condition and happiness of human life seemed to depend upon the answers given these problems. These different movements complemented and accele- rated one another, both the results and the problems of this new
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life binding humanity ever more firmly to the immediate world surrounding it.
Moreover man himself, the doer of the work, develops his own nature through the work that he does; and by "man" we mean man as he lives in the flesh, not as he stands trans- figured in a philosophical system. History and society, as they now appear, both contribute towards this result. Their forces come more intimately together, space and time no longer separating them so efi'ectively; they unite in a common work and become conscious of a pervasive complete solidarity. Humanity stands before us as a great whole. It unites forces that were formerly scattered, forming enduring relationships which bind individuals together and immeasurably enrich the capacity of life as a whole. Humanity thus presents itself as an object of reverence and faith, an object which seems capable of absorbing the whole ethical and practical activity of man.
This new method of thought must reshape every department of life (such as art and science) in characteristic fashion. In every direction it must produce the same efi'ect, it must make every form of activity closely dependent upon the external world. From this point of view, only contact with tilings can lead human forces to living reality and away from mere ghostly possibilities ; on the other hand, a separation from concrete things, an entrenchment of the soul in its own inner life, must make all our efi'orts lifeless, shadowy, and unreal. The basis and motive power of this tendency is the desire for genuine reality, and to its supporters all the older, idealistic views of life seem like wreaths of early morning mist, doomed to vanish before the victorious light of the on-coming day.
2. The Limitations op the New Realism
Is the light of this day free from shadow? Shall we un- doubtingly accept the new tendency ? The actual fate of the realistic movement shows us that the matter is not free from complications. Realism, it is true, has not only carried the opinion of humanity with it, with overwhelming force ; it has also given an immense impetus to work, accelerated our whole existence, aroused us to a more manly overcoming of difficulties
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and to a more victorious attack upon all that is irrational. At the same time the growth of the movement has pro- duced problems which take us beyond the boundaries marked out by realism and endanger the independence of the realistic sphere. The realistic system could justly pose as the one all-sufficing reality only if the simple progress of the world's work itself solved every difficulty ; only if all independent inner life more and more completely dis- appeared and man became transformed into a mere instrument for doing work. But no such transformations have taken place. On the contrary, the actual course of events has clearly shown us that mere work by no means absorbs the whole man. To begin with, work has come more and more to mean a bitter struggle for existence, a struggle between individuals, classes, and peoples ; the contrasts have become sharper and sharper and the field of conflict larger and larger. The passions which this struggle has aroused show clearly enough that standing behind the work are sensitive beings, craving for happiness and demanding from their work some personal compensation, even though the work itself lose by giving it. Is there any way of meeting the perils arising out of this demand, save by drawing upon the inner life — that is, upon a quantity which strict realism cannot logically recognise ?
The complications, moreover, go beyond the conflict of the forces which work disengages and seem to be inseparably bound up with the very nature of work. Work never develops more than a portion of human faculty, and the more specialised the work the smaller the portion : the field which a given individual can cover becomes continually narrower and more limited. From the point of view of realism this neglect of all but a few special capacities, this stultification of the man as a whole, must be a matter of indifference, since from this standpoint life is no more than contact with environment. But it cannot be a matter of indiff'erence to the actual man, who sujQfers loss and pain. There is obviously more in him than the realist recognises — or logically can recognise. Moreover, work iudis- solubly connects man with his achievement, with some result ; from this point of view all effort is wasted which produces
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no tangible result. This has the efifect of turning the mind entirely towards what is outward and making the soul indifferent to its own welfare ; indeed, realism cannot even allow the existence of inner states of soul. This continual striving after result, success, and recognition must more and more absorb men and repress all independent psychical life (it has in reality thrust it far into the background). We cannot welcome such a situation. We are conscious of a painful vacuity, and having this consciousness our work no longer satisfies us ; in spite of all its successes it leaves the soul homeless. For humanity as a whole this complete absorption of existence in work means an impoverishment of the spiritual content of life. The absence of common ideas and convictions to inwardly unite humanity results in the disappearance of a common thought-world and the infliction of a severe injury upon the whole of mankind, for without such a thought-world our life can have no independent value, no true greatness, and no soul.
These are no mere abstract philosophical considerations. They are the undeniable experiences of modern humanity. Can any one possibly deny that, in spite of the brilliant triumphs of modern labour and ingenuity, there has arisen amongst us a profound and growing discontent not unmixed with pessimism ?
The nineteenth century, more than any other epoch, enlarged the whole aspect of life and improved human conditions. One would have expected it to close with a proud and joyful consciousness of strength. The fact that it did not do so points to an error in the type of life which dominated the period. This error is to be found in the desire of realism to eliminate the soul. And the soul tcill not allow itself to he eliminated. The very attempt to deny the soul only arouses it to greater activity.
3. Criticism of the Traditional Forms of Idealism
Experience of this sort compels a revision of the whole question. It is incumbent upon us to determine, as far as is possible, in what respects each view is right or wrong. The desire for complete reality in life could hardly have manifested itself in such a powerful tendency as realism has shown itself
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to be if the traditional forms of idealism had not been lacking in such reality. There is no doubt they did suffer from this lack and were no longer firmly